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Climate change is the most important challenge facing the planet and one of the most 
interesting common pool resource problems. Since the climate is a non-excludable public good, 
the fear of free riders should dissuade rational individual municipalities from local action. 
Indeed, the vast majority of municipalities do not implement climate change mitigation policies.  
In the three papers of this dissertation, I examine policymaking in those municipalities 
that do choose to act on their own. First, I develop a theory of co-production and planning among 
local governments and across levels of authority that opens up space for examining municipal 
action on commons issues. I explore the framework among small and rural municipalities using 
three case examples that illustrate the potential for local action, but present the challenge that 
polycentric approaches lead to externality problems and require multilevel governance to ensure 
coordination and compliance.  
The second paper uses a survey of 1,841 municipalities to examine the role of state 
climate action plans and state-to-state regional climate change initiatives in creating a multilevel 
governance environment conducive to local action. Using a logistic regression model, I conclude 
that the likelihood of a municipality planning for climate change increases in a supportive 
multilevel environment with important differences between small and large places. 
The third paper uses interviews with leaders in twelve small communities, which are 
 labeled “unlikely pioneers” because they act on climate change against the odds as calculated in 
the second paper. This paper examines two theories about local government action on global 
commons issues: public choice theory, which argues that internal factors drive action, and 
multilevel governance, which frames policymaking as arising from both internal and external 
factors. The results show support for both. Public entrepreneurs can spearhead municipal climate 
policies on their own by reframing global issues with an internal focus, but fiscal capacity limits 
response. Multilevel governance is found in places with municipally-owned utilities, which face 
top-down regulation. However, these municipalities have access to a stream of revenue from the 
utilities that enables more sustained climate change mitigation programs.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
You know that the action today is in cities. You want to save the world? You 
start saving it in cities… We will save the world one plan at a time, one 
initiative at a time, one strategy at a time, but make no mistake, we will save 
the world.  
George Heartwell, mayor of Grand Rapids, Michigan1 
 
Mayor Heartwell’s confidence in local governments echoes research and practice 
literature in which municipalities are viewed as the leaders of sustainability and climate change 
action. After the first Rio Earth Summit in 1992, hundreds of municipalities took up the charge 
of sustainability called for by the United Nation’s Agenda 21 (Yanarella & Levine, 2011). In the 
U.S., and in the absence of strong national leadership, some public officials have proposed 
innovative sustainability plans for the largest urban areas (Young, 2010).  
Municipalities are an important component of the ability of national governments to meet 
climate change goals (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003) and have been the focus of greenhouse gas 
mitigation policy since the late 1980s (Bulkeley, 2010). Local government was discussed as an 
important actor in the 1987 Brundtland Report and at the first Earth Summit in Rio de Janiero in 
1992 (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003). During the closing decade of the 20th century, pioneering 
municipalities, such as Toronto, Newcastle, Heidelberg and Munich, developed climate change 
action plans that evolved largely from existing energy conservation efforts (Bulkeley, 2010). 
Transnational networks helped these global cities to adopt greenhouse emissions targets, climate 
change mitigation plans, and implementation policies (Schroeder & Bulkeley, 2009). The first 
                                                           
1 Mayor George Heartwell spoke on a panel about climate change at the 2013 Mayors Innovation Project 
conference in Washington, DC on January 15, 2013. 
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decade of the 21st century saw a second wave of municipal action that encompassed a more 
diverse set of cities including smaller municipalities and those from the developing world 
(Bulkeley, 2010). Hoffman (2009) describes this increase in municipal climate action as the 
emergence of a shadow system of climate governance that encourages experimentation and 
fosters policy specialization at the local level.  
Research finds cities responsible for 50 to 75 percent of carbon emissions (Satterthwaite, 
2008; Stern, 2006) and local governments have the capacity to reduce those emissions in a 
number of ways. Compact residential development, which municipalities can control through 
zoning, leads to 20 to 40 percent less driving (Ewing, Bartholomew, Winkelman, Walters, & 
Chen, 2007). Research in Virginia suburbs finds that requiring denser single-family housing 
patterns can reduce greenhouse gas emissions from building heating and cooling by five to nine 
percent annually (Pitt, 2013). Chicago neighborhoods with 33 percent tree cover reduce 
emissions due to air conditioning by 3.2 to 3.9 percent per year – a figure that could have been 
much larger but for the city’s relatively short cooling season and the substantial amount of 
nuclear power generated electricity (Jo & McPherson, 2001). Boston plans to require energy 
efficiency upgrades to existing buildings when they are sold; a move that the city expects will 
reduce emissions by seven percent by 2020 (Lubber & Hunt, 2010). Today municipal solid waste 
accounts for four percent of greenhouse gas emissions nationwide and advances in technology 
and practice (especially increased recycling, composting, and energy recovery) have cut 
emissions by 85 percent from 1974 to 1997 (Weitz, Thorneloe, Nishtala, Yarkosky, & Zannes, 
2002). In addition, the close connection that cities have with businesses and residents makes 
them an important educational actor and possible role model for non-governmental entities 
(Collier, 1997).  
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Despite such potential most municipalities do not act on climate change (Conroy & Iqbal, 
2009; Saha & Paterson, 2008). According to a 2010 national survey, only 12 percent of 
municipalities have created a baseline of emissions or set reduction targets; 22 percent have 
sought to reduce energy use in municipal transportation fleets and outdoor light fixtures; only 
five percent offered energy audits to private businesses (Svara, 2011). While several hundred 
municipalities of all sizes have created and adopted climate change action plans (Boswell, Greve, 
Seale, & Mroz-Barrett, 2011), there are tens of thousands of local governments in the United 
States and the vast majority do nothing. For most officials, integrating global concerns into 
municipal management is a difficult task (Bai, 2007) and prospects for scaling up the number of 
local governments who act is uncertain (Hoffmann, 2009).  
 
The problem of urban policy theory and climate change 
Urban theorists largely break down into two camps (A. Harding, 2009). Public choice 
advocates seek to explain the ways in which people sort into groups and neighborhoods with a 
spatial version of economic utility-maximization as the mechanism. Community power theorists 
put decision making at the core. In this section, I briefly review the literature around the 
contemporary economic and power theories of policymaking. In all cases, the theories of 
municipal policy emergence focus on internal factors, such as public service delivery, taxation, 
and other quality of life and economic issues. With local leaders responsible to local voters, 
municipalities become institutional actors without much incentive to protect common pool 
resources, such as the atmosphere, unless such action results in a local benefit.  
Public choice theory is an economic theory of urban politics. In his famous essay, “A 
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”, Tiebout (1956) described a normative model of 
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policymaking centered on the citizen as consumer. People would choose their community of 
residence based upon the degree to which a municipality satisfied the consumer’s demand for 
particular public services. Policy development is based on the notions of individualism, 
instrumentality, and rationality and is modeled on economic markets (Christensen & Laegreid, 
2002; O’Flynn, 2007). Intermunicipal relations are based on competition as local governments 
pursue economic development projects in order to enlarge the tax base, often at the expense of 
their neighbors. Critics argue that public choice theory makes huge assumptions about the 
services available, the information that citizens can access, and the true mobility of people, who 
are typically constrained to a particular locale by proximity to work, cost of housing, and 
location of family (Oliver, 2001). The role of power is absent; residents are simply consumers 
who create policy by voting for leaders (Gendron & Domhoff, 2009). Yet powerful actors often 
frustrate voters. For example, development interests regularly succeed in pushing projects ahead 
despite citizen preferences to the contrary (Siskind, 2006).  
Similarly, growth machine theory emphasizes competition with other municipalities in 
order to secure economic growth. However, in this case a coalition of powerful of stakeholders 
drives an economic development agenda (Molotch, 1976). This growth imperative limits the 
ability of other social or environmental initiatives to take hold. Local leaders rise to power by 
sharing in the economic development vision of the community and, often inadvertently, produce 
policies that harm the environment.  
Urban regime theory focuses on a coalition of local government officials and private 
interests with the latter providing the resources to implement a joint program (Stone, 1993). The 
regime model builds on the notion that government has the responsibility to implement policies, 
but lacks the capacity to accomplish its entire agenda. The municipality forms a public/private 
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governing coalition from which it can draw the resources. Unlike the growth machine, business 
interests alone cannot control urban policies, but must work with diverse partners (Stone, 1989). 
Although economic growth is often central, the need to put together a coalition means other 
priorities can be acted upon (Mossberger, 2009).  
Policy entrepreneurship is a theory of action by local leaders who recognize and seize 
opportunity for change in a community (Page, 2006) by harnessing a changing flow of events 
(Stone, 1993). Schockly (2008) adds the notion that entrepreneurship serves an equilibrative 
function that restores stability to a policy regime. Entrepreneurs are not sole actors as other levels 
of government may create opportunity through regulations, funding programs, or other 
incentives. Local citizens, who might be particularly interested in, educated about, or politically 
disposed to an issue may also contribute to the formation of an opportunity.  
Different entrepreneurial actors have different motivations (Schneider, Teske, & 
Mintrom, 1995). Political entrepreneurs (e.g. mayors) often emerge out of advocacy over issues 
such as pro- or anti-growth, concern over services, tax levels, or budgetary crisis. Some come 
from the business community and seek to establish policies benefiting that constituency. 
Bureaucratic entrepreneurs (e.g. city managers) are driven by the desire to achieve specific 
policy goals, solve problems, and serve the public. Managers’ performance also helps them 
compete for better positions in larger communities. City managers are often innovators, and 
while they must navigate local politics, they also reach beyond to test innovations that have been 
vetted by their professional associations. Entrepreneurs must hold together coalitions of 
supporters by emphasizing the collective mission and vision. In order to be successful, they must 
broaden the range of options that people in the community consider and reframe choices in order 
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to break through existing routines and lead people to challenge the status quo. The difficulty in 
making change is often used as an excuse to protect power or avoid conflict (Galston, 2006).  
Urban social movement theory understands change as brought about by actors seeking to 
impact popular consciousness (Fainstein & Hirst, 1995) by framing issues to mobilize a 
constituency, transform bystanders into supporters, exact concessions from targets of the 
movement, and demobilize antagonists (Rabrenovic, 2009). Recent coalitions have come 
together to support planning and equity policies, especially those aimed at alleviating urban 
poverty (Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka, 2009). For example, a citizen movement in Los Angeles 
forced government leaders to provide better public transit to inner city minority neighborhoods 
(Grengs, 2002). However, activists can also pursue strategies that work against environmental or 
egalitarian outcomes (Fainstein & Hirst, 1995). 
These theories appear to have very different forces driving action, but they share an 
inward focus on changing local conditions, which is usually short-term given election and 
budgetary cycles. These theories struggle to find a motivator for action on issues of the regional 
or global commons, unless there is a direct connection between cost and benefit (E. Ostrom, 
2010). As described by my results in chapter four, many pioneering communities find ways to 
internalize local benefits of climate change action. However, none of the communities acts alone, 
instead interacting with other municipalities, levels of government, and/or non-governmental 
actors, often for technical expertise or fiscal capacity. Power, capacity and coordination are 
common challenges. 
Feiock (2004) offers institutional collective action (ICA) as a theoretical framework to 
account for municipal cooperation, especially on issues of the regional commons. When the 
spillover benefits of collaboration outweigh the transaction costs of forming new institutions, 
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communities have the incentive to achieve joint goals through voluntary agreements and 
associations on issues of economic development, environmental protection, or other public 
goods. Such voluntary collaboration among municipalities is at the core of co-production and 
communicative planning as it involves broadening the perspectives represented, increasing the 
number of options, fostering ownership of policies, and developing more comprehensive 
solutions (Forester, 1999; Innes, 1996; Innes & Booher, 2003).  
However, this framework of voluntary regionalism by intermunicipal bargaining falls 
short without an organizing structure. Voluntary deliberations by individuals to reduce negative 
externalities require that parties have complete information and property rights be easily 
definable (Coase, 1960). Voluntary bargaining among municipalities is often not successful 
given power differences (Warner, 2008). The number of municipalities that can engage in the 
negotiation is limited by the need to build trust and accountability among partners (E. Ostrom, 
2010). Often a trained facilitator is needed to establish the conditions that lead to successful 
outcomes, especially on complex issues (Innes, 2004). In the United States in the area of 
environmental protection, the federal government usually imposed top-down regulations that 
eliminated the need for bargaining among local governments to protect a common pool resource. 
Such systems work for some issues, but as problems and solutions become more complex, this 
one-size fits all strategy becomes less effective (Fiorino, 2006).  
In this introductory chapter I develop a theory of co-production and planning among local 
governments and across levels of authority that opens up space for examining municipal action on 
issues of the global commons. This multilevel collaborative framework is key to understanding the 
importance of local knowledge and policy production around commons issues, such as climate 
change. In this way I seek to build on the standard theories of policy emergence, which focus on 
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the importance of local leadership and incentives. To them I add the multilevel nature of 
governance. This construct provides an opportunity for us to understand local governments not as 
independent actors in a competitive market, but as part of a complex web in which various levels 
of government shape local action. My theoretical framework allows for the inclusion of power, 
which can be examined not only as a force that can lead to inequitable policymaking among 
bargaining municipalities, but also as a centralized authority that can support, incentivize, and 
coordinate action. This multilevel governance framework provides for a more robust understanding 
of the ways in which local governments act, not only around the issue of climate change, but also 
for policymaking involving commons issues. 
  
Co-production and planning  
Theories of co-production and planning travel on parallel and intertwined paths. Co-
production is often described as the inseparability of the way we think about nature and society 
and the way we choose to live in the world (Jasanoff, 2004). Much of the co-production literature 
seeks to temper the assumed authority of physical science over other kinds of knowledge, 
especially the wisdom embedded in customs and practices. The same power dynamics typically 
govern policy development, especially when a centralized authority has goals that require local 
government action. Co-production, for my purposes, is about knowledge creation and policy 
development in a manner that understands and includes a range of interested and affected parties. 
I conceive of planning as the boundary institution that bridges the “science” and the 
“civic” as well as the “central” with the “local” – all of which are necessary to create workable 
policy on complex, commons issues. Planning’s main role is not as a political symbol, 
educational venture, or enabler of the policies of the powerful. Planning, in my framework, co-
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produces policy between science and civic, central and local, powerful and weak, and so on. In 
some cases this might occur within a municipality, for example, among neighborhoods or 
individual stakeholders. In this dissertation the unit of analysis is the municipality and how each 
acts on its own or in a multilevel collaboration to mitigate the problem of climate change.  
This conception represents a departure from planning’s rational roots, which are 
epitomized by the top-down imposition of vision during the City Beautiful Movement and Urban 
Renewal and in which the final product (the plan) was crucial. At the same time, I challenge the 
more process-dominated conceptions of communicative planning that emphasize consensus 
building. Planning as co-production is a process that results in a plan. This plan serves as a 
boundary object through which the various involved parties can see their interests represented.  
In this section, I first deal with the problems of knowledge production, then I move to the 
value of co-production, and finally I reach the intersection at which planning becomes the 
boundary institution (and plans become the boundary objects) that allow diverse stakeholders 
and perspectives to tackle complex problems (Guston, 2001).  
The traditional understandings of knowledge and policy production 
The world has never been a simple place, but for thousands of years we probably did not 
know any better. The rise of the centralized expert began in the period of Enlightenment when 
such people were granted the authority to shape society through scientific and technological 
advances (Brand & Karvonen, 2007). This privileged status accorded to science perpetuates the 
philosophy that there is “one world, one and only one possible true account of it, and one unique 
science that can capture that one truth most accurately reflecting nature’s own order” (S. 
Harding, 2000, p. 129). With one truth, it flows that there is likely one optimal policy solution to 
a problem.  
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More recently, however, as problems in our global society multiply and the growing 
ranks of stakeholders become more diverse, simple answers are impossible. People continue to 
harbor ambitions of control, and science increasingly strives to bring that control. But that veneer 
of power over complex issues simply heightens uncertainty as knowledge is always incomplete 
(Sarewtiz, 2000). The higher the stakes and the larger the systems involved (for example, the 
atmosphere), the more uncertainty exists in knowledge and the disputes among stakeholders over 
values increase (Bäckstrand, 2003).  
The production of knowledge has different conceptions. Turnbull (1997) describes a 
simple dichotomy. There is imperialist science, defined by rationality and methodology with 
knowledge taking on the imprimatur of a universal truth. And there is local knowledge, which is 
value laden. Failure to recognize the local, Turnbull claims, makes science hierarchical and 
exploitative. For example, he says, in Indonesia, the Green Revolution, which had been sparked 
by western science, turned the nation from an importer of rice to an exporter, but with 
devastating consequences to the environment including the loss of local rice varieties, a dramatic 
increase in pests, and the collapse of rice harvests. Such failure often occurs when policymakers 
do not engage local stakeholders. Instead they create a dynamic of power, knowledge, and action 
that results in nature or local people “biting back in unexpected ways” (Leach, 2008, p. 1784).  
Researchers eventually came to realize that the inquiry into wicked problems is not the 
scientific examination of facts, but rather “an endless, inconclusive inquiry into alternative 
possibilities” (Lindblom, 1994, p. 332). The process has been dubbed a “collective experiment” 
by Latour (1998), who says that science does not bring certainty to issues or order to society. 
Instead, science adds ingredients to a process. Despite that recognition, the science-policy 
interface often remains restricted to researchers who simply inform policymakers and 
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policymakers who view science as technical assistance; citizens act only as the recipient of 
policy (Bäckstrand, 2003). This raises questions about whether science can live up to its promise 
to better society (Lemos & Dilling, 2007) and whether policymaking can achieve its goal of 
being based on evidence (Owens, Petts, & Bulkeley, 2006). 
In addition, people are increasingly skeptical of supposed scientific truths and often 
cannot even agree on the conception of a problem. The gap between knowledge and policy can 
be due to communication and timeliness of information. With politically charged issues, 
policymakers may be selective about the knowledge they use, if they use research at all (Owens 
et al., 2006). Policymakers’ perspectives often conflict with resource users’ knowledge and 
social framing (Leach, 2008). The ways that people interact with resources not only color their 
knowledge creation, but also limit it (S. Harding, 2000). Environmental problems are complex 
because they involve the interaction of biological, physical, and social systems and require the 
collaboration of scientists, policymakers, and citizens (Lemos & Morehouse, 2005). 
Sustainability and sustainable development are contested concepts and for this reason require a 
more deliberative form of governance (Kemp & Martens, 2007).  
Co-production of knowledge and policy 
Local knowledge and citizen-based expertise become part of the discourse, not as a 
public participation exercise, but as a partnership with the policymaker and/or technical analyst. 
Such democratization offers the most effective path for avoiding disasters, which result from 
stifling of perspectives (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993). Knowledge and policy are embedded in 
customs, identities, institutions, and other components of society.  
To that understanding, I add the notion of engagement, such as described by Bäckstrand 
(2003), who uses the term ‘civic science’ to describe a triangle of scientists, policymakers, and 
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citizens co-producing both knowledge and policy. Knowledge also has three components 
according to Edelenbos and others (2011), who describe scientific knowledge as developed by 
experts who bring field specific norms, values, and methodologies to a problem. Bureaucratic 
knowledge comprises an understanding of political and administrative processes and stresses the 
strategic use of knowledge with less of an emphasis on substance. Stakeholder knowledge 
derives from context or location and concerns insights and experiences that come from day-to-
day practices and local customs.  
Co-production is very concrete as it is both about how people organize and express 
themselves as well as about accounting for their values and ways that they assume responsibility 
(Jasanoff, 2004). Local engagement on issues leads to greater acceptance of conclusions (Martin 
& Richards, 1995) and tends to identify the actors missing from the knowledge generation and 
policy creation processes (Corburn, 2009). Through an iterative negotiation process between 
centralized ‘expert authority’ and local knowledge, culture, and customs, co-production of policy 
can be more sustainable economically and environmentally (Lemos & Morehouse, 2005).  
The drive for a co-production approach can result in the formation of new institutions to 
handle the incorporation of new knowledge and new technology (Miller, 2004). Cash, et al. 
(2003) outline three institutional factors that relate to improved co-production. First is 
communication. Mobilizing knowledge requires active, repeated, and inclusive communication; 
effectiveness suffers when communication is just one way. Second, mutual understanding is 
required. This involves eliminating jargon and taking care with language as well as recognizing 
different experiences of participants. Third is mediation, as increased understanding does not 
necessarily eliminate conflicts. Overarching frameworks are required to mediate legal, economic, 
educational, and cultural values, especially when held by those lacking capacity (Saward, 1993).  
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Boundary organizations can facilitate knowledge transfers, mutual understanding, and 
generate the boundary objects that can be commonly used by people within the scientific, 
political, and local spheres to provide stable relations across the boundary (Guston, 2001). Such 
organizations can be responsive to various perspectives by mediating the shifting domains of the 
scientist, policymaker, and local stakeholder. For example, the U.S. Cooperative State Research, 
Education, and Extension Service, in dealing with the depletion of the High Plains Aquifer in the 
western United States, provided space for long-term relations to develop, two-way 
communications to be fostered, and the changing interests of various actors at multiple levels and 
with various degrees of power to be addressed. The service also created agricultural and 
economic models that served as boundary objects since participants could use them to explore 
future scenarios from their own perspective (Cash, 2001). The creation of such boundary 
institutions and objects can produce a highly contested and complicated discourse (Waterton & 
Wynne, 2004). But the contestation and uncertainty, “as unwelcome as it so often is, opens our 
eyes” (Maynard-Moody, 1995, p. 18) and generates the vigorous discussion that can lead to a 
policy response (Corburn, 2009; Forester, 1999). If all of the actors had to agree, nothing would 
ever get done, vagueness is required, “ambiguity is part of the translation” (Latour, 1996, p. 48).  
Sustainability efforts in particular will be more effective when the boundaries between 
knowledge and policy are managed in a way to improve the relevance, credibility, and legitimacy 
of information (Cash et al., 2003). Co-produced knowledge must be scientifically valid, relevant 
to policymaking, and recognized by stakeholders (Edelenbos et al., 2011). In her case study of an 
interaction between climate scientists and policymakers in Europe, Lövbrand (2011) found a 
close, but uneasy, relationship between researchers and policymakers in Brussels. Scientists did 
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engage stakeholders more closely than in typical research efforts and sought to provide 
information needed for policymaking.  
Social learning and the co-informing relationship between nature and society played out 
in a case study of local planners engaged with federal climate change scientists to devise 
contextually relevant strategies to combat the urban heat island effect in New York City 
(Corburn, 2009). Researchers on the team were initially reluctant to work with local planners 
who lacked a scientific background. However, the local non-scientists had knowledge about the 
built environment that made the heating model more accurate and more reliable for 
policymaking. Other stakeholders weighed in, such as the department of transportation with a 
pavement inventory and the parks department about trees. The various voices led to a more 
precise policy solution to a complex scientific and social challenge. 
This is not to say that co-production policy systems are perfect. Co-production increases 
the opportunities for innovation and social impact, but can involve enormous commitments of 
time and personnel (Lemos & Morehouse, 2005). Scientists also found themselves placed in an 
uncomfortable position between academic freedom and the goal of creating politically salient 
knowledge that is useful to society (Lövbrand, 2011). Conflicts between expert knowledge and 
local stakeholder understanding occur due to different perspectives, values, and motivations 
(Edelenbos et al., 2011). Collaborations fail when one party determines that their best interest is 
to delay decision making (Kraft & Johnson, 1999). Power is also an important factor that could 
disrupt collaborative networks (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Kettl, 2002).  
Planning’s role in co-production 
Into this world, we insert the planner. Through the 20th century, the phrase “city 
planning” and more general conceptions of planning have changed. Olmsted described planning 
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as the “well-considered control on behalf of the people of a city over the development of their 
physical environment” (Olmsted, 1916, p. 1). Indeed, it is still most often conceived as a rational 
way of preparing for the future through, for example, the gathering and analyzing of data, the 
testing of alternative scenarios, and evaluating costs and benefits (Kelly, 2010).  
Other people argue for a more process-oriented view of planning (Innes & Booher, 
2003). Planning may be the creation of a guide for future action, but it faces a world of 
conflicting interests and power inequity (Forester, 1989). Results matter, but there is much more 
to be gained than simply having a plan. Co-production and collaborative planning involve 
broadening the perspectives presented (Forester, 1999; Innes, 1996; Innes & Booher, 2003). 
Citizens can make a variety of contributions beyond their local knowledge including ingenuity, 
financial resources, and political accountability (Fung, 2008). Social psychological literature 
provides evidence that deliberation can lead to individual and collective benefits (Carpini, Cook, 
& Jacobs, 2004). 
McCrum, et. al. (2009) found that deliberation fosters social learning about climate 
change adaptation among land managers. In this Scottish case study, deliberative workshops 
created meaningful interactions and exposed people to a wide variety of strategies. Land 
managers engaged with scientists as equals and reframed the research into strategies that would 
suit their particular situations. This reframing helps ease local conflicts and often requires 
coordination between levels of government (Mendes, 2007). The goal of involving stakeholders 
is not about finding direct interests and undertaking conflict resolution, but rather about 
broadening the diversity of values represented in order to ensure that outputs are compatible with 
wider community interests (Margerum, 2002). Doing so can reframe power relationships within 
a municipality and can also result in strategies that share benefits (Innes, 1996). When examining 
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natural hazard planning, Burby (2003) found that broad stakeholder involvement contributes to 
plan quality and the likelihood of implementation. 
Consensus need not be the goal of a planning process. Indeed, Lindbloom (1994) warns 
that avoiding controversy in the search for consensus is a major impairment of the policymaking 
practice. Social learning occurs as stakeholders establish the dimensions of an issue and wrestle 
with various solutions (Collins & Ison, 2009). “Decision making, planning, and participatory 
processes are dances in which the initially relevant can become irrelevant and the apparently 
irrelevant can become relevant” (Forester, 1999, p. 135). Bargaining increases efficiency, the 
acceptance of a decision, and the quality of the decision since the controversy forces an 
examination of many alternatives (Nutt, 1999) and the messiness can create space for radical 
solutions (Cochrane, 2010). 
Haggett (2009) elaborates on three types of public engagement. The first is simple 
information provision, which can include efforts at education. Often this is an attempt to 
persuade people to adopt already announced policies and can encourage protest since the 
opportunity to provide meaningful input was missed for one reason or another. Second is 
consultation, which provides the opportunity for outside voices to shape projects and helps the 
public support plans. The third form of engagement is deliberation. The public does not simply 
discuss and shape plans crafted by others, but has an active role in developing policies and plans 
from the beginning. As with more general co-production, this form of engagement is rare and 
requires a commitment of resources. In his analysis, Haggett has presented a rethinking of 
Arnstein’s (1969) classic Ladder of Citizen Participation. (See Figure 1.) The typology describes 
eight rungs of participation, which move from non-participation through tokenism to various 
degrees of citizen power.  
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Figure 1 – Arnstein’s classic Ladder of Citizen Participation 
 
(Arnstein, 1969, page 217) 
 
What then is the role of planning in co-production? Forester (2012) argues that planning 
must move beyond technical, aspirational, and goal-oriented practice towards a more nuanced 
and performative approach. Planning is less about knowledge and more about redirecting action 
among interconnected (yet independent) stakeholders. Planning becomes facilitative leadership 
among expertise, power, and difference. The planning process transforms a rational, goal-driven 
venture to one that involves democratizing a process, which becomes more representative of the 
possibilities and pitfalls of particular issues. 
Technically rational planners can achieve some measure of accomplishment. However, 
they may fail to recognize that much of the “data” a planner needs cannot be culled from 
standard socio-economic databases; it resides with residents and other stakeholders. Often, it 
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cannot be counted. It is only in communication that such information is revealed – and it often 
comes laden with power relationships, discourse challenges, and misunderstandings about 
communities, people, and socio-economic systems. This is particularly true with a global 
commons issue, such as climate change mitigation. Local governments and citizens must 
understand the real long-term dangers of inaction while centralized expertise and power must not 
dismiss the local costs of greenhouse gas reductions. In this way, planning must be based on 
communication as a path to action, and a theory of planning cannot be comprehensive without 
both communication and action. The pair distinguishes the planning field from studies of 
political science or sociology.  
Planning practitioners are co-producers. Planning does not generate new information, but 
it can be the kind of institution, as described by Miller (2004), that seeks to incorporate the range 
of knowledge in active policymaking. Planners communicate, translate, and mediate the 
components described as essential to bridging the civic and the science (Cash et al., 2003). 
Planning is more than symbolic or educational. Planning has become the boundary organization 
between the technical and the civil; planning is the institution that facilitates action. The plan 
becomes the boundary object from which stakeholders, no matter their perspective, can see their 
vision reflected. This theory of planning situates the discipline as a co-producer of knowledge 
and policy.  
 
Competition versus cooperation: governance frameworks for co-production  
Planning must be sensitive to power if it is to result in action (Forester, 2012). The ideal 
of co-production, especially in the context of planning, recognizes the importance of power in 
relationships; a skillful planning process is vested with the ability to rebalance power differences 
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(Innes, 1996). However, I contend that while shared power and collaboration is crucial to climate 
change policymaking, an overarching authority is needed to enforce and provide coordination, 
particularly as the number of players starts to grow. For larger scale and longer term 
environmental issues, such as climate change, the need for coordination across communities in a 
fragmented governance framework is critical – not only from a knowledge exchange perspective, 
but also in terms of how the problem is framed, who has power to act, and what happens to 
externalities (Homsy & Warner, 2013). This concern motivates my attention to co-production 
within a multilevel governance framework. In this section, I want to illustrate three governance 
approaches to environmental protection prominent in the discourse around climate change: 
independent local action, top-down governance, and multilevel governance. This discussion 
builds to the theory I seek to test in my research – that a multilevel governance framework is 
necessary to understand the co-production and planning of knowledge and local policymaking 
for climate change mitigation.  
 
Independent local action 
The importance of local government as an independent actor is strong in the United 
States. The public choice approach theorizes that municipalities might act on their own and 
innovate local solutions tailored to fit local circumstance (V. Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961). 
Such an independent approach requires strong internal motivation to drive environmental change, 
which could come in the form of various co-benefits such as budget savings, economic growth, and 
protection of quality of life (Fischel, 2001; Jochem & Madlener, 2003; Kousky & Schneider, 
2003). Local actors better understand local needs and thus may provide for public goods better than 
a higher authority (McGinnis, 1999). Elinor Ostrom (2009, 2010) hypothesized that this manner of 
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public goods provision at the metropolitan region offers a model for the governance of the global 
commons. Such a competitive approach to resource allocation envisions municipalities using 
strategies best suited to the local environment, citizenry, and other particulars of local 
circumstance. As illustrated in Figure 2, all levels of government can act and push towards action 
on climate change. The advantages of this system lie in the diversity and overlapping nature of 
action as there is little coordination. In the United States, this is the dominant climate change 
framework as there is no state or federal mandate on climate change action by local governments.  
 
Individual municipal innovations can contribute to sustainability, but realizing the complete 
utility of these efforts requires developing integrated knowledge systems, such as exists in the 
agricultural, defense, and health sectors (Cash et al., 2003). Bottom-up action on climate change 
has been slow to grow among municipalities (Svara, 2011). Independent initiatives cause an 
economically ineffective patchwork of regulation, duplicative enforcement efforts, cross-boundary 
mismatches between pollution sources and effects, shuffling of high-carbon activities to weaker 
regulatory areas, and confusion over responsibility between levels of government (Lutsey & 
Figure 2 – Independent local action by municipalities  
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Sperling, 2008). Systems can become clogged with too many independent localities making too 
many different policies, which result in a confusing network relationships, lack of transparency, 
and ill-defined missions (Curry, 2009). 
Policy decisions and implementation result in external impacts – some positive, others 
negative. In a polycentric system of independent actors, local governments can internalize 
benefits and push negative impacts onto the larger system (Warner, 2011). Local stakeholders 
grow frustrated with the lack of coordination and express the desire for a holistic approach to 
greenhouse gas mitigation (Greenwood, 2012). Some overarching institutional framework is 
needed to mediate and help negotiate differences and development mutually beneficial 
arrangements (McGinnis & Ostrom, 1992). 
Municipal leaders face obstacles, including divergent views about climate change among 
stakeholders as well as contradictory perceptions of the role of cities (Bai, 2007). When 
municipal governments do decide to act, they face legal and administrative challenges: few cities 
have bureaucratic homes for climate change policy, most municipalities lack the capacity to 
develop and implement appropriate policies, and action often requires significant upfront costs 
(Betsill, 2001). Legal frameworks at various governmental levels limit the options available to 
municipalities (Schroeder & Bulkeley, 2009; Sharp, Daley, & Lynch, 2011). Independent action 
on climate change undercuts the potential for standardization, which can result in a better 
regulatory framework and economies of scale around data collection (Sovacool & Brown, 2009). 
Top-down governance 
As a non-excludable public good, the opportunities for free-riding on climate mitigation 
are high. In addition, the costs of action are incurred over the short-term, while the benefits can 
be decades in the future and may be geographically dispersed. Local government action on a 
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wide variety of external matters, including climate change, challenges the basic economic notion 
that individuals (in this case individual local governments) would rarely act to protect commons. 
For this reason, environmental protection has traditionally involved regulations promulgated 
from the top-down and left little room for local discretion (Fiorino, 2006). As illustrated in 
Figure 3, local governments often receive environmental marching orders from the federal 
government through the states. In some cases, there is room for feedback with the federal 
government adjusting rules based upon data from localities (dashed line). This command and 
control system is responsible for making the United States a leader in environmental protection 
by cleaning up the worst environmental problems (Fiorino, 2006). Some maintain this is the 
necessary model of action on issues of the global commons, such as climate change mitigation 
(Stavins, 2010).  
 
Although still prominent today, by the end of World War II, the field of public 
administration had realized that in many cases, top-down regulation frustrates efforts to tackle 
complex problems (Kettl, 2002). This traditional, expert-driven system focuses on technical 
Figure 3 – Top/down governance  
   23 
problem solving (Fiorino, 2006) and treats the world like a machine to be monitored and repaired 
in parts (Innes & Booher, 2001), which are easy to administer, but not reflective of reality 
(Agranoff & McGuire, 2003). Command and control regulations provide little flexibility for 
fitting solutions to specific local circumstances (Mazmanian & Kraft, 1999). Much information 
is lost as experts focus narrowly and exclude other voices (Brand & Karvonen, 2007).  
 
Multilevel governance 
Multilevel governance is primarily found in Europe. The framework emerged as a way to 
analyze and organize the European Union relationship with its member states (Bulkeley & 
Betsill, 2003). It engages multiple tiers of government in a communicative process and authority 
becomes diffuse, not only across various public actors, but also among private entities (Kern & 
Bulkeley, 2009). Governance takes place locally and globally, and represents a reconfiguration 
of authority from top-down to a networked scheme (Bulkeley, 2010).  
An important feature of the multilevel governance framework around the issue of climate 
change is the location that transnational municipal networks hold within it. These networks are 
voluntary, non-hierarchical, and create a kind of municipality-to-municipality form of self-
governance (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009). The networks have limited ability to govern, as they do 
not have the authority to sanction, but these volunteer networks offer expertise, funding 
opportunities, and knowledge dissemination in such a way as to form “soft regulations” 
(Bulkeley, 2010, p. 237) that can induce local action. In the United States, research suggests that 
network membership by municipalities correlates to only small or moderate increases in 
greenhouse gas reduction activity (Krause, 2012). Many members are laggards and, as a result, 
these networks remain effective largely for pioneers (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009). 
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Multilevel governance’s synthesis of multiple levels of government and non-
governmental organizations has a lot in common with collaborative public management, or 
network governance (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004). Agranoff and McGuire (2003) offer three 
theories for the emergence of such systems. The social change thesis argues that technological 
change allowed people to link across organizational and geographic boundaries. The problem 
change thesis makes the case that a more complicated world requires collaborative structures to 
pursue solutions. Finally, the urban regime theory argues that effective governance requires 
specialized knowledge and talent often found outside of the public sector. This typology 
resonates with the emergence of multilevel governance around climate change. More research is 
needed to situate it empirically, but local greenhouse gas mitigation policies appear to represent 
the confluence of all three: the emergence of a more complex problem which needs extra-
governmental resources and links all of these actors by technology.  
“Cooperative federalism” describes a multilevel governance situation in the United States 
in which state and local governments participate in the implementation of federal standards 
(Fischman, 2005). For example, in the case of permitting cell phone towers, municipalities are 
allowed to make local land use decisions regarding the site, but within a broader federal 
framework (Salkin & Ostrow, 2008). However, this example represents the federal government 
imposing a national policy on local governments. Then local governments use local policy, 
developed independently, to achieve the federal goals. Given the relative simplicity of cell phone 
tower siting, this approach is likely sufficient.  
A more interactive and co-productive approach, however, would have multiple levels of 
government, along with other stakeholders, come to the table with their diverse knowledge and 
policy perspectives. Figure 4 graphically illustrates such a framework across many municipalities 
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while the Rouge River Watershed case example, in chapter two, describes a specific case in 
which multiple stakeholders shaped the policy solution to a complicated environmental problem. 
Centralized knowledge comes together with local knowledge to develop innovative solutions. 
Strategies can be shared with other communities as well as passed up the governance chain to be 
disseminated as best practices. Governing the climate change commons includes increased dialog 
among stakeholders, government, and scientists; an overlapping and layered network of 
institutions; and a process for learning and change (Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern, 2003).  
 
Any such collaborative processes may require large investments in coordination and are 
subject to many challenges including power struggles, turf battles, and expectations of resource 
contributions (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Kettl, 2002; Kraft & Johnson, 1999). Relationships in 
a collaborative governance framework are not as stable as within a single government agency. 
Leaders and actors often change (Wilbanks & Kates, 2010) and crucial informal channels are 
less pervasive in a system with many partners than in a single institution (Goldsmith & Eggers, 
2004). Without a central authority, success relies on creating relationships among leaders 
(Stoker, 2006; Thurmaier & Wood, 2002).  
Figure 4 – Multilevel governance  
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The current project 
My contribution to the literature lies in situating theoretically and empirically the role of 
municipalities in climate change action, particularly in terms of their motivations to act. I bring 
together theories of policy emergence and focus on the need for a co-productive discourse within 
a multilevel governance structure where a higher level of government has the power to sanction, 
coordinate, and incentivize action on greenhouse gas emissions reduction. Research over the last 
ten years, often through case studies, has described and investigated the initiatives of large, 
pioneering cities, which have the capacity and the internal motivation to act alone. But these 
studies, while important, leave out the smaller places that may not have the local drive or 
resources to act on issues of the global commons. In this dissertation, I seek to broaden our 
understanding to a more diverse group of municipalities than currently exists in the literature.  
The first paper in this dissertation seeks to hypothesize an effective framework for 
climate change action by local governments. Co-authored with Cornell University Professor 
Mildred Warner, this analysis focuses on the potential for increased greenhouse gas mitigation 
policies by rural governments through the co-production of scientific knowledge and policy 
within a multilevel governance framework. We argue that local knowledge is crucial to effective 
policymaking, but we caution that local, independent policymaking by municipalities leads to 
externality problems that require multilevel governance to ensure coordination and compliance. 
This paper was published in Sociologia Ruralis, volume 53, number 3, July 2013.  
The second paper empirically investigates the framework outlined in the first paper – that 
multilevel governance leads to more local climate action than if municipalities act on their own. 
Using a national sustainability survey of 1,841 municipalities, I test two hypotheses: (1) that 
municipalities will be more likely to adopt climate change policies in a multilevel governance 
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framework rather than one in which municipalities must find internal motivations; and (2) that 
smaller places will benefit more from a multilevel governance environment than bigger cities. I 
found support for both hypotheses. All municipalities have increased odds of climate change 
action when engaged in a multilevel governance environment, but the effect is stronger among 
smaller places. Increased odds of action in larger places is tied to participation in regional 
multistate networks. Using existing regional multistate coalitions as a model, I present options 
for a coordination and capacity building governance framework.  
This paper is important in the literature because it is one of the first to examine a range of 
municipalities across sizes and metro status (city, suburb, rural) as well as the first to account for 
a variety of governance frameworks. It is more generalizable to the American situation because 
most people do not live in the urban cores often described as climate change leaders. According 
to the 2010 Census, less than one-third (29.7%) of Americans live in the 313 municipalities with 
more than 100,000 people. Nearly half of U.S. citizens (46.5%) live in municipalities with a 
population of less than 25,000 or in rural unincorporated areas. Only 35 cities have more than 
500,000 residents and only 278 have between 100,000 and 500,000 residents.  
The final paper in this dissertation uses the results of the statistical model devised for the 
second paper to launch a qualitative inquiry into the question about internal motivations versus 
external drivers of local climate change action. Given that only certain municipalities adopt 
greenhouse gas mitigation policies, and most academic scrutiny focuses on the big cities, I 
sought to use my research to extend our understanding of policymaking in this area to smaller 
municipalities. In this paper I use interview data from communities that are “unlikely pioneers,” 
which are so deemed because they were predicted by the statistical model in chapter three to 
have low likelihood of acting – but then they did act. In these communities, the study finds that 
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policy entrepreneurs, often pushed by internal drivers such as cost savings or personal ethics, 
were responsible for the climate change action. In a few cases, top-down regulation on municipal 
utilities provides an external push towards action. I find little co-production of knowledge or 
policy with other levels of government, although regional networks of peers are important 
sources of technical information. Finally, the lack of financial capacity, which might be part of a 
co-productive multilevel governance framework, blocks additional progress on these issues. 
 
Methodological Approach and Limitations 
Across the three papers in this dissertation, I use a mixed-methods approach. Such a 
combined set of strategies allows me to uncover information in different ways, provides 
redundant data from multiple sources, and ensures that biases from one approach are not 
replicated in another (Axinn & Pearce, 2006). I use three different strategies. None, individually, 
gives a complete picture of what is happening. Taken together the picture of action becomes 
more complete, although much remains to be explored. At the request of my dissertation 
committee, I include this broad methodological treatment in the Introduction. Each paper also 
contains the methodological details needed for the reader’s comprehension.  
In the first paper of this dissertation, my co-author and I use case examples to establish a 
theoretical framework arguing for the importance of co-production within a multilevel 
governance environment. We draw examples from academic publications and the general media. 
We sifted through numerous cases before settling on the three presented in chapter two. Using 
such broad sources, allowed us to find the stories that best illustrated our theoretical framework 
and we analyzed our case examples through the co-production/multilevel governance lens 
described here. We recognize that this methodology is limited because the information in the 
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cases was described by others with different perspectives. Also, sources from the general media 
have not been subject to academic peer review. We interpreted them in light of our argument, but 
that interpretation is a generalization, which may obscure nuances in each example. 
In second paper, which comprises chapter three, I devise a multilevel, logistic regression 
model to examine the socio-economic and governance factors that correlate to local government 
planning for climate change. The strength of this survey data approach is that conclusions drawn 
from a large, representative sample are more reliable than inferences from smaller samples or 
case study research (Axinn & Pearce, 2006). It allows the analysis of internal governance factors 
in comparison to external multilevel ones and their correlation to local climate change planning.  
The sample used for analysis is the most comprehensive national survey of local 
governments dealing with issues of sustainability. However, this large-n quantitative approach 
has limitations. First, the selection of variables is governed by previous research, which, in this 
area, is far from comprehensive. Second, I do not know how well the surveyors pre-tested their 
instrument. I have realized through subsequent surveys that respondent interpretations of 
questions can vary. Third, there are only so many predictor variables I can include – or even 
think to include. For example, I did not conceive of the role of municipal utilities as an 
independent variable when I built my regression model; its potential importance was not 
revealed (at least to me) until the interviews of the third paper. (But I learn and grow and have 
added that factor to newer survey research projects of which I am a part.). Finally, the universe 
from which the sample was selected does not include unincorporated towns and townships. This 
leaves out some suburban and rural places in 20 states.2  
                                                           
2 The International City/County Management Association, which conducted the survey, has traditionally 
excluded town and township type governments. My work on this current project has demonstrated that 
some of these towns actually have governments with significant functions. My colleagues and I are 
working with ICMA to revise their sampling methodology.  
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The third paper (chapter four) builds from the results of the second and seeks to 
investigate the different motivations of local government officials for action. I use the statistical 
model from the previous paper to identify deviant communities – those that acted although the 
expectations of their doing so were very low according to the statistical model. By interviewing 
public officials from a dozen communities, I am able to strengthen analytical generalizations 
(Yin, 1998) – and, indeed, I did find corroboratory evidence across the communities. Also, I used 
key informant interviews with people who have firsthand and more than average knowledge of 
the local government under study. The interviews were semi-structured, which allows 
respondents to bring up issues that the researcher had not preconceived (Axinn & Pearce, 2006) 
and allows researchers to glimpse the key informant’s perspective (Patton, 1990). In this case, 
the lack of rigidity paid off as numerous topics were raised, for example, about the role of 
citizens or municipal utilities that would not have been discovered in a survey. My focus on 
deviant cases allows richer information and deeper causation for a problem than examining 
average cases (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
The weakness of this approach, in general, includes potential bias due to my questions, 
poor recall on the part of the key informants, interviewees giving me what he or she thinks I 
want to hear, and response bias (Yin, 1998). More specific to my paper, it should be noted I have 
not conducted in-depth case studies, but rather examined planning documents and interviewed 15 
people in 12 communities. This has allowed my analysis to have some more depth and 
perspective than possible in the statistical analysis of the second paper, but it is still limited. 
First, the limited number of cases, although better than a single community, is less generalizable 
to the broader population of municipalities and municipal leaders than an analysis with a larger 
sample. Second, one or two interviews per community provides a limited perspective; 
   31 
recollections fail or are focused on personal efforts rather than understanding broader dynamics. 
I try to compensate for this by interviewing the person(s) most likely to have that broad 
knowledge in this issue area, e.g. the city manager, mayor, or sustainability director. 
One finding from this third paper (about the reduced role for citizens) runs counter to 
current sustainability and planning theory and has stimulated ideas for future research. From this 
third paper, I have identified two places that might be interesting municipalities for in-depth case 
studies. In these I can further examine the role of the citizen, as well as the notion of local 
leadership and co-production within a multilevel environment. Also, as originally outlined in my 
research proposal, I would like to identify and research communities that were more likely to act 
on climate change, but did not – deviants in a different direction. 
 
Conclusion 
In May 2013, the monthly average level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere topped 400 
parts per million for the first time since measurements have been taken – and perhaps for the first 
time in three million years (Kunzig, 2013). As time passes with little action, the costs of reducing 
greenhouse gases enough to limit warming to two degrees Celsius will increase dramatically 
(Rogelj, McCollum, Reisinger, Meinshausen, & Riahi, 2013). What role will cities play? 
Taken together the papers in this dissertation demonstrate that expectations of significant 
municipal action on climate change will not happen without external forces working in a 
collaborative web. Pioneers do find internal motivations for action, but they are not isolated, 
independent actors. The research demonstrates that local governments and municipal officials 
can be innovative and craft the best policies for their local circumstance. However, local 
governments do not have the fiscal capacity, technical expertise, or power to bring about 
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significant change on their own. Higher levels of government are needed to provide knowledge 
and financial support as well as coordinate the action in such a way so as to eliminate free riding. 
The title of chapter three asks, “Will Cities Save Us?” The answer is that they can make an 
important contribution to greenhouse gas mitigation, but, for the most part, they do not and 
cannot act on their own. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE CO-PRODUCTION OF  
KNOWLEDGE AND POLICY IN RURAL U.S. COMMUNITIES3 
 
 
Abstract 
Climate change mitigation requires action at multiple levels of government. We focus on 
the potential for climate change policy creation among small rural municipalities in the US. We 
argue that co-production of scientific knowledge and policy is a communicative approach that 
encompasses local knowledge flowing up from rural governments as well as expertise and power 
(to coordinate and ensure compliance) flowing down from higher authorities. Using 
environmental examples related to land use policy, natural gas hydro-fracturing, and watershed 
protection, we demonstrate the importance of knowledge flows, power, and coordination in 
policy creation. Recognizing the crucial role of co-production in rural policymaking, we then 
apply those lessons to local government action on climate change. In this matter, co-production 
of knowledge and policy requires respect for local knowledge and a broader framing of issues to 
include both environmental and economic perspectives. While we see potential for local action, 
we caution that polycentric approaches lead to externality problems that require multilevel 
governance to ensure coordination and compliance.  
 
Introduction 
Climate change is one of the most contentious areas of public policy in the United States. 
Even though international talks on climate change have stalled, the potential exists to move 
                                                           
3 An earlier version of this paper has been published: Homsy, G.C. & Warner, M.E. (2013). Climate 
Change and the Co-Production of Knowledge and Policy in Rural US Communities. Sociologia Ruralis 
53(3) 291-310. 
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forward with local governments, which are well positioned to address some greenhouse gas 
emissions (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006; Kousky & Schneider, 2003; Ostrom, 2009). Municipalities 
in the United States have the power to mitigate emissions through land-use rules, transportation 
programs, building codes, and other policies. However, the number of local governments 
engaged in concrete action remains relatively low, particularly among smaller places (Svara, 
2011). Many American municipalities are small and rural, and lack the technical knowledge and 
fiscal capacity to act. Many also lack the political will and refuse to accept the conclusions of 
climate scientists (Carter & Culp, 2010).  
A special challenge with climate change policy is that much remains unknown. Although 
scientific understanding is rapidly evolving, agreement about the seriousness of the climate crisis 
is being undercut by a disinformation campaign (Jacques, Dunlap & Freeman, 2008). Sociology 
of knowledge recognizes the crucial role of situational context and the interconnections between 
normative assumptions, policy judgments and empirical data. Sociology of science scholars 
stress the importance of an approach that studies science creation as well as its acceptance and its 
impact on real world policy (Alrøe & Noe, 2010). 
A second challenge with climate change is the need to both respect local diversity and to 
develop structures for the coordination of local action and exchange of knowledge. Land use 
planners emphasize local perspectives in the formation of environmental, economic, and social 
equity policies of regional import and within various power structures (Forester, 2012). We 
believe, along with Martins and Richards (1995), that the participation of local stakeholders is 
critical as their local knowledge sharpens policies and leads to greater acceptance of conclusions. 
But how much does situational context matter when long-term issues are scaled up to the global 
level as with climate change (Hanekamp, 2009)? Just as knowledge and policy imposed from the 
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top-down may lead to inappropriate action, purely local decision making on regional and global 
issues, such as climate change, may be ineffective as it faces challenges, such as lack of 
coordination, externalities, and spillover effects. Linking the knowledge of local stakeholders, 
including the general public, to higher level technical expertise allows for joint knowledge 
creation and effective policy action. This co-production approach creates tensions, but also opens 
the possibility for polycentric action on global issues – action that is owned and respected at the 
local level (Ostrom, 2009; Healey, 2008).  
In this article we explore the co-production of knowledge and policy as it relates to 
climate change and the rural community response. Using examples of environmental policies 
that relate to climate change, we demonstrate that co-production, which involves two directions 
of knowledge flows and learning (top-down and bottom-up), is critical. We also emphasize the 
importance of framing the issue in a wide enough context to promote local stakeholder support 
among the diversity of rural communities. Given the importance of externalities in 
environmental policy, we explore the need for a multilevel governance framework to coordinate 
co-production and ensure compliance.  
In section 2 we demonstrate the importance and potential for a local role in climate 
change policy. In section 3 we explore three features that make co-production of knowledge and 
policy so important in climate change: the complex nature of the problem, the need for bi-
directional learning (top-down and bottom up), and the need for coordination across a range of 
actors. Despite the complexity of climate change, local input is required to shape a robust policy 
response. But externalities and spillovers necessitate some coordination and sanctioning power. 
In most cases, that might be a centralized authority. However, local governments may have the 
power to coordinate action with each other through various organizations. This is particularly 
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important in rural areas where centralized sanctioning power may be less effective. In the fourth 
section, we present several examples that illustrate alternative architectures for environmental 
management. Through these we examine the challenges and opportunities facing various 
environmental governance structures among rural communities and demonstrate the value of 
multilevel governance, which balances polycentric local action with the power to coordinate in a 
multilevel government framework. We conclude with implications co-production of knowledge 
and policy may have for rural areas around the issue of climate change mitigation policy. 
 
Climate change policy in US municipalities  
The history of international governmental climate change policy pays little attention to 
local action, often requiring only token stakeholder consultation when implementing mitigation 
strategies (Fogel, 2004). On their own many municipalities have moved to address climate 
change issues. In the United States, states and municipalities have been in the forefront of 
developing policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Hecht, 2009). American municipalities 
have the power to manage their own governmental processes, and they can affect the operations 
of citizens and the private sector in areas such as land use, transportation, and building efficiency 
through education, incentives, or regulation (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006). Studies across numerous 
countries indicate that 30 to 50 percent of greenhouse gas emissions can be controlled through 
local government policies (Lindseth, 2004).  
The impact of big cities versus rural areas on greenhouse gas production is still being 
researched. Large urban areas tend to be more carbon efficient than sprawling suburbs or rural 
communities (Glaeser & Kahn, 2010). Many blame cities for 75 percent or more of carbon 
emissions, though others find that emissions are significantly less, perhaps only 57 percent, with 
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agriculture and forestry accounting for 31 percent (Satterthwaite, 2008). Suburban residents emit 
twice the greenhouse gas emissions as urban dwellers (Hoornweg, Sugar, & Trejos Gómez, 
2011) and rural commuting comprises a large and growing portion of total miles driven in the 
United States (Renkow & Hoover, 2000). 
Despite such a large portion of emissions emanating from outside of urban cores, the 
spotlight of local action in the United States shines on big cities. While important, this focus is 
incomplete. Just one-fourth of the United States population lives in municipalities with more 
than 100,000 people, and more than half, according to the 2010 Census, reside in jurisdictions of 
fewer than 25,000 people. Although most live in metropolitan areas within the economic and 
environmental sphere of a city, each municipality, no matter how small, often develops its own 
environmental protection, land use, and economic development policies. In urban and 
metropolitan areas, population density and agglomeration of business and talent promote 
knowledge sharing and innovation among municipalities and this permits emergence of regional 
collaboratives that help member communities exploit economies of scale and funding support for 
climate change mitigation and adaption (Svara, Read, & Moulder 2011). 
However, rural and smaller communities lag behind in many ways. Planners seeking to act 
on climate change in smaller municipalities face lack of political will, disbelief in the value of 
local action, few peer communities for learning, lack of resources, and a poor scientific 
understanding of the problem (Carter & Culp, 2010). These challenges lead to lower rates of 
sustainability policy adoption among smaller and rural places (Homsy & Warner, 2012). For 
example, a national survey of 2,176 US municipalities and counties in 2010 ranging in 
population size from 2,500 to more than 8,000,000 found that the rate of undertaking greenhouse 
gas inventories in communities with fewer than 50,000 residents is one-third that of communities 
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with a population larger than 100,000 – and only one-sixth in communities with fewer than 
10,000 residents (Svara, 2011). Just 55 percent of communities smaller than 25,000 in population 
have conducted energy audits of their buildings, while 93 percent of municipalities with more 
than 100,000 people have undertaken such basic energy conservation and climate change 
measures (Homsy & Warner, 2012). Interestingly, rural areas tend to slightly outperform 
suburban areas in terms of general sustainability policy adoption, which is likely due to the 
ability of suburban areas to free ride on the actions of central cities (Homsy & Warner, 2013).  
Municipalities do not act alone; legal frameworks at various governmental levels play an 
important role in shaping the options available to municipalities for open space conservation 
(Schmidt & Paulsen, 2009) and the mitigation of climate change (Schroeder & Bulkeley, 2009). 
Small communities in Sweden that make the most progress in greenhouse gas reduction receive 
significant assistance from the national government (Langlais, 2009). 
We argue that local action is crucial in climate change mitigation where the diversity of 
context and capacity constraints undercut top-down, one-size-fits-all regulation. Rural areas, in 
particular, seek to reconcile the diverse demands of resource extraction, commodity production, 
property rights, and environmental protection without the necessary knowledge, structural, fiscal, 
or political resources (Wolf, 2011). By framing the issue from the local perspective, climate 
change becomes grounded in local realities, such as floods, droughts, or pest infestations. This 
may lead to more successful policy interventions as rural residents craft policies that respond to 
their perceptions of and priorities for action (Ostrom, 2009; Rayner, 2010). However, although a 
localized approach may help achieve goals of CO2 reduction and climate change adaptation, it 
will also result in uneven policies. Such a polycentric approach requires a multilevel governance 
framework to provide the authority for local action, the scale to promote coordination, and the 
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power to ensure compliance. This is why we give attention to the architecture of a multilevel 
governance framework in the co-production of knowledge and policy. 
 
Co-production of knowledge and policy 
The theoretical basis for the co-production of knowledge in addressing climate change 
occurs in three arenas. First, as a complex, multidisciplinary and global phenomena, climate 
change science requires a complex, multi-faceted view. Second, policy and knowledge networks 
must be open to multiple frames of reference and directions of learning; a simple top-down 
approach does not work. Finally, attention must be given to power differences and the need to 
coordinate action across communities. If not, individual actions will lack impact. 
Complexity and the Need for Co-Production 
The ordering of science through knowledge and technology, and the ordering of society 
through power and culture create complex interactions (Jasanoff, 2004a). A combined order does 
not come easily as similar events are interpreted through different frames across communities, 
within nations, and around the globe. Co-production does not give primacy to either the 
knowledge of science or the knowledge of society, but recognizes the importance of both 
(Jasanoff, 2004b).  
 In the policymaking sphere there exist additional divisions beyond the science-society 
dichotomy. Scientific knowledge generation is typically top-down and urban centric, and, 
therefore, associated policies tend to emanate from the center and to recommend solutions that 
assume ‘one size fits all’, yet climate policies in an urban core may make little sense (physically, 
culturally, or economically) in most rural communities. Traditional top-down systems 
promulgate prescriptive regulations, which leave little discretion. They also tend to focus on 
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individual industrial processes and categories of pollution rather than holistic or ecosystem 
issues. Compliance is viewed as legal enforcement rather than environmental cleanup (Fiorino, 
2010) with success narrowly defined as uncovering evidence of violations rather than innovative 
approaches to problem solution (Gore, 1997).  
Climate change represents an example of what Rittel and Webber (1973) call a ‘wicked' 
problem, which is hard to define, woven intricately into other issues, and defies efforts to contain 
within boundaries. Climate change intervention strategies must be comprehensive so that a 
particular action does not just reduce greenhouse gases in one location or time period or for one 
product, but affects the entire supply chain or life cycle of the activity (McDonough & 
Braungart, 2002; Pauli, 2010). The dual scientific/society nature of wicked problems and the 
fluidity of the processes breed uncertainty and require a multi-faceted approach. 
Traditionally, the complexity in rural areas has been ignored; the primary focus of rural 
policy in the United States is on agricultural production (Bryden & Warner, 2012). The lack of a 
multi-functional view in US agricultural policy leads to a productivist focus that emphasizes 
short-term economic competitiveness over more complicated concerns with equity or long term 
environmental sustainability (Shortall & Warner, 2010). Rural development policy in the 
European Union has a multi-functional focus uniting agriculture, rural development, and 
environmental protection (Bryden, 2005; Marsden, 1999; Shortall, 2004). As a result, in the 
E.U., rural people in particular have come to see themselves as stewards of the environment. 
This sentiment in less pronounced in the US, in part, because national policy does not articulate 
stewardship as a priority. 
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Local framing/ local knowledge – policies that survive 
When people see the natural resource under discussion as important to their own well-
being, it increases the likelihood of local action (Ostrom, 2010). However, that link is strained 
when trying to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, which requires short-term costs to the local 
actor, while the benefits of lowering the gas content in the atmosphere are diffuse; they are 
distant in time and often distant in place. An additional complication is that the impacts of 
climate change vary considerably from place to place. Increased droughts and floods will 
negatively impact some rural populations while benefiting others (Jensen, 2009). For example, in 
some rural communities logging companies have profited from harvesting trees killed by 
increased pine-borer beetle infestations, while other rural communities have lost economic 
livelihood as the same infestations raise threats of fire and cause declines in recreation.  
The federal government in the United States has experimented with forms of multilevel 
governance, dubbed “cooperative federalism” by legal scholars, in an effort to harness local 
knowledge and account for place-specific situations. Most common in environmental law, 
cooperative federalism describes a situation in which state and local governments participate in 
the implementation of federal standards (Fischman, 2005). For example, in the case of permitting 
cell phone towers, municipalities are allowed to make local land use decisions regarding the site, 
but within a broader federal framework that facilitates decision-making processes and promotes 
tower construction (Salkin & Ostrow, 2008). However, with primary control at the local level, 
municipalities simply act as an agent of federal policy – they can shape decisions within their 
own borders, but little information flows up to higher levels or horizontally to other 
municipalities. A more interactive approach has the federal government setting minimum 
standards that local governments can exceed; this results in more dialogue among actors and 
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innovation (Sovacool, 2008). For example, in California, both the state and federal authorities 
made decisions to protect endangered species in the Sacramento River Delta (Fischman, 2005). 
Framing in such cases is critical. Local culture, development history, geographic 
conditions, and historical events impact local policy proposals (Brennan et al., 2009). 
Environmental policies regarding climate change must be comprehensive and coupled with 
economic and social equity to ensure sustainability (Svara et al., 2011). This is particularly true 
among rural local governments in the United States. Research has shown that links to economic 
development make rural communities more willing to enact environmental protections (Warner 
et al., 1999). Co-benefits play an important role because they connect local benefits to the local 
costs of action, and are often the reason some municipalities decide to tackle climate change in 
the absence of other drivers (Hamilton & Akbar, 2010). Cost savings are a major co-benefit of 
municipal greenhouse gas reduction programs (Kousky & Schneider, 2003). Another motivator 
is local public health (Bloomberg & Aggarwala, 2008). Such reframing of climate change can 
transform an abstract concept to a local, tangible, and actionable one (Metz & Below, 2009). 
However, such an approach might limit success because it suggests that climate change 
mitigation and economic growth will always be compatible (Toly, 2008). Also, localizing 
climate change in this way might push problems from one community to another, if 
comprehensive environmental laws and monitoring are not enforced across the rural to urban 
landscape (Bai, 2007).  
 Rural communities can offer specialized knowledge that makes the co-production of 
climate change policies more effective. Rural areas in the US are diverse; the ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
policies handed down from Washington, just do not translate well (Brown et al., 2003). Although 
higher levels of authority have the power, the top-down imposition of regulations can alienate 
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people, who must act on policy. Top-down approaches leave little room for local innovations and 
issue framing that links global concerns with local priorities. Local culture and social networks, 
particularly among local leaders, are critical in helping rural communities prepare for and 
respond to crisis (Flora et al., 2003). Rural communities that engage in the production of local 
knowledge, learn from difference, and allow symbolic diversity and debate are ultimately more 
willing to invest local resources toward solving problems (Flora & Flora, 1993). Centralized, 
expert-driven systems, which focus on technical problem solving and treat the world like a 
machine to be monitored and repaired in parts undermine the potential for democratic 
engagement in policy decision making (Fiorino, 2006; Innes & Booher, 2001). A rural 
community’s connection to the natural environment and the environmental values of local 
officials are important motivators for local action on climate change (Homsy, 2013).  
 Ostrom (2009) sees potential in such a polycentric localized approach. The core idea of 
polycentricity is that the users closest to the resource provide the greatest safeguards; they have 
the knowledge, desire, and relationships. In addition, the distributed nature of local action 
provides redundancy, encourages innovation, and increases the overall robustness of the system. 
Some argue that polycentric systems are harder for free riders to exploit due to the mix of 
institutions and actors involved (Dietz et al., 2003). But lack of coordination and sanctioning 
authority may increase externalities in such distributed approaches to political, economic and 
social order (McGinnis, 1999).  
Power and Coordination – The Need for Multilevel Governance 
In a co-production system, power is needed to enforce and provide coordination, 
particularly as the number of players starts to grow. Ostrom (1990) gave voice to the idea that 
users of common pool resources can self organize and protect local resources – to avoid a 
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tragedy of the commons. Her work shows the value of local knowledge, local control, and local 
organization in managing environmental problems. However, she describes its success as limited 
to small groups (Ostrom, 2010). For larger scale and longer term environmental issues, such as 
climate change, the need for coordination across communities in a fragmented governance 
framework is critical – not only from a knowledge exchange perspective, but also in terms of 
how the problem is framed, who has power to act, and what happens to externalities. Purely local 
provision of environmental services does not recognize the critical importance of power and the 
need for some level of central coordination. Centralized guidance and incentives have been 
found to be important in local implementation of climate adaptation policies (Brouwer, Rayner, 
& Huitema, 2013).  
Kousky and Schneider (2003) found that fiscal co-benefits drive local efforts to reduce 
greenhouse gases. However, rural local governments often do not have the power to make 
decisions that would result in local co-benefits in some areas, such as transportation, the way that 
large cities do. Lukes (2005) defines three types of power: power over (typical of hierarchical 
forms), power to (authority to act) and power with (ability to work together in concert). Too 
often environmental policy has been built from a power over perspective. Climate change policy 
needs to build shared power that enables actors at all levels to act in concert. Our concern is that 
such collaboration still needs the power to coordinate and sanction – a power typically reserved 
to a higher level of government. This concern motivates our attention to multilevel governance in 
climate change knowledge and policy action. 
With a global environmental issue, such as climate change, there is also the potential for 
standardization, which can result in a more efficient regulatory scheme and provide the 
uniformity needed to conduct business across a large area (Sovacool & Brown, 2009). At the 
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national or global level, there are economies of scale involving data collection and response. 
Higher levels of governance can reduce the potential of externality and spillover effects between 
local jurisdictions. Decision making on a community-by-community basis also risks becoming 
clogged with too many participants, resulting in confusing network relationships, lack of 
transparency, and ill-defined or parochial missions (Curry, 2009). 
Reliance on local action also creates coordination problems. Every policy action results 
in ancillary impacts (Jochem & Madlener, 2003). A characteristic of polycentric governance 
systems is the incentive for one group to internalize benefits and shed negative externalities onto 
the larger system (Warner, 2011a). An institutional framework is needed to mediate these 
differences by having various parties come together and work out mutually beneficial 
arrangements (McGinnis & Ostrom, 1992). In rural cases, networked governance has co-evolved 
as both a response to and a driver of environmental change and resource management challenges 
(Wolf, 2011).  
Rural communities have experience with horizontal collaboration, especially in 
government service delivery (Warner, 2006). They often face thin private markets for service 
delivery and need to create a public market of cooperation to address their problems (Warner, 
2011b). Experience with collaborative approaches is primarily horizontal and functional; the 
challenge is to build vertical collaboration in a multilevel governance framework that respects 
the unique knowledge of rural communities. This is the promise of co-production of knowledge 
and policy, which recognizes the potential for neo-endogenous rural development based on a 
multi-faceted, multilevel governance framework (Shucksmith, 2010).  
Any promise, however, will not be realized without addressing differences in capacity 
between rural and urban communities. Rural areas with weak economic development, small tax 
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bases, and limited capacity can be trapped in a vicious cycle of underinvestment (Warner & 
Pratt, 2005). Homsy and Warner (2013) found that smaller municipalities rely more heavily than 
larger ones on the citizenry to shape and oversee sustainability policies. The study also found 
professional municipal management is more important to sustainability policy adoption in 
smaller places than in larger ones, but cities have more technical staff for policy adoption and 
implementation. Other studies find similar results, for example, Carter and Culp (2010) found 
rural municipalities in the western United States lack the technical knowledge and fiscal capacity 
to adopt local climate change policies. 
 
Knowledge generation in environmental policy creation  
In this section, we use a series of case examples to make clear the drawbacks when local 
governments produce environmental policy on their own or when policy production is purely 
centralized without local knowledge. We rely on media and project reports for these examples. 
While not full case studies, these examples demonstrate the importance of co-production of 
knowledge and policy and the need for a multilevel governance architecture in which local 
governments act as more than agents of higher level policy, but partners in its production.  
No state (or the federal government) imposes top-down climate change rules on local 
governments or engages in efforts to co-produce greenhouse gas mitigation policies. Therefore, 
we build our case, initially, around examples drawn from other environmental issues of the 
regional commons. These illustrate the types of challenges facing local government action on 
climate change, the most important global commons issue today. They demonstrate that rural 
municipalities struggle to act on issues much closer to home than climate change, and they show 
the potential a multilevel governance framework, in which policy is co-produced, can have 
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positive results on commons issues. We focus our analysis on local governments, which exercise 
control over numerous sources of greenhouse gas emissions and adaptation policies through their 
jurisdiction over land use regulations and related transportation policy (Betsill, 2001).  
Not coincidentally, these case examples also have links to climate change. For rural 
areas, settlement patterns, natural gas extraction, and water quality are arenas where climate 
change has critical impacts. First, from the perspective of climate change mitigation, we look 
critically at the connection between local land use planning and inefficient settlement patterns. In 
this first example, we discuss the benefits and limits of the traditional polycentric approaches to 
land use control at the local level, and the challenge for coordination either through state policy 
or voluntary networks such as ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability. Our second 
example looks at natural gas, which is a potentially cleaner fossil fuel. Its extraction is typically 
outside the control of local government. In this instance, we see how failure of communication 
up and down levels of government has hindered knowledge flows and produced tension between 
local and statewide environmental protection and economic development goals. Our final 
example presents a successful co-production process with a multilevel governance framework 
that resulted in the protection of a large watershed that crosses many rural and urban 
communities. It offers a potential model of climate change policy co-production among federal, 
state, and local levels of government. A comparison across these examples shows the critical 
importance of the multilevel governance architecture in polycentric co-production systems, 
especially for rural areas. 
America’s fractured land planning system – the limits of polycentrism 
Land use regulations – the ability to control physical development – are critical tools in 
local climate change mitigation and represent one of the few strong powers that local 
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governments have in the United States. The 50 American states establish broad frameworks 
within which municipalities can act, but land use planning is a power typically reserved to local 
discretion (Frug & Barron, 2008). Local governments can make decisions on the location, size, 
density, and aesthetics of buildings and this impacts the settlement patterns and transportation 
requirements of the community. In many cases, this local control builds on local knowledge and 
results in physical development that respects local needs and culture. Land use decisions are 
usually made independently of circumstances in neighboring municipalities, including regional 
environmental concerns, and there is no recourse when the actions of one community negatively 
impact another. This bottom-up process is markedly different from Europe where, for example, 
in Germany and England land use regulation is shared among all levels of government with 
national agencies setting policies for local governments to implement (Schmidt & Buehler, 2007; 
Williams, 1999).  
The lack of coordinated land use planning across municipalities in a region can result in 
sprawl and associated greenhouse gas emissions. Worldwide transportation accounts for 13 
percent of greenhouse gas emissions (Dulal et al., 2011), but in the United States it is twice that 
level (27 percent) (US EPA, 2011). Rural and suburban land use regulations typically encourage 
low-density development, and the strict separation of land uses makes automobiles a necessity 
(Brandes et al., 2010; Andrews, 2008; Ewing et al., 2007), especially in rural areas (Renkow & 
Hoover, 2000: Champion & Brown, 2012).  
Land use policy is both uncoordinated in the United States and municipalities often 
compete for real estate development and property taxes engendering hostility between them 
(Pendall, 2003). This can be particularly true in rural and peri-urban communities that have 
limited economic development opportunities. The communities most likely to chase economic 
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development with business incentives are those with lower tax bases, higher unemployment, and 
who face the highest levels of inter-jurisdictional competition (Warner & Zheng, 2013). In such 
an environment, municipalities have an incentive to promote development that ignores negative 
environmental spillovers on neighboring communities and the region (Howell!Moroney, 2008).  
 A few states, such as Oregon and California, encourage local governments to coordinate 
land use to achieve broader environmental goals (Daniels, 2001; Barbour & Deakin, 2012). 
Oregon coordinates local land use among rural and urban governments by requiring communities 
to work together to draw urban growth boundaries that protect forest and farmland, concentrate 
development, and curb the spillover impacts of sprawl (Daniels, 2001). Local planning rules 
must be consistent with state policies (Abbott et al., 1994). California recently passed legislation, 
which requires local governments to coordinate land use and transportation planning with the 
specific goal of decreasing greenhouse gas emissions (Barbour & Deakin, 2012).  
 Such arrangements can be considered passive examples of co-production. They allow the 
opportunity to use local knowledge in specific contexts to shape rules within regional goals set 
by the state. However, the states usually do not engage actively with municipalities in drafting 
local land use rules. Instead, they provide centralized knowledge in the form of generalized 
guidance and best practices about ways to achieve central goals through local land use. Local 
governments then find ways to adapt these for themselves. Unfortunately, most states do not 
offer much of a coordinating policy framework for local governments.  
The lack of guidance from state or federal governments in the United States is 
problematic given the broad externalities of land use decisions on climate change. The role of 
incentivizing and coordinating local action has fallen to various non-governmental organizations; 
the most prominent, and illustrative of the challenge of voluntary action, is ICLEI Local 
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Governments for Sustainability. This international organization is among the largest engaging 
with local governments to coordinate land use planning in an effort to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. Formed in 1990, with 200 member municipalities, ICLEI has grown to a network of 
1,220 local government members in 70 countries with more than 550 in the United States (ICLEI 
2008). This transnational network of local governments facilitates the exchange of ideas, offers 
technical assistance and information, and sets policy goals (Bulkeley and Betsill 2003). ICLEI 
carries no formal authority, but it does have an impact on members by virtue of the opportunities 
and resources it offers including technical expertise. ICLEI resources include best management 
practices, access to protocols to simplify the complicated task of inventorying emissions, target 
setting, and other forms of “soft regulation” (Bulkeley 2010, p. 237).  
With only several hundred member municipalities across the entire United States, 
ICLEI’s lack of penetration into rural communities is not a surprise. Traditionally, such non-
profit actors have played a minor role in the efforts of rural areas to govern their natural 
environments (Wolf, 2011). Local and technical capacities are the limiting factors as smaller 
communities often lack the human resources needed to craft and implement sustainability 
policies. Approaches based on co-production and polycentrism thus fall short in achieving a 
broad impact unless a multilevel governance framework provides for the power to incentivize 
and enforce new policy approaches. 
Gas drilling and knowledge flows – the importance of local knowledge 
Climate change policy, especially reducing greenhouse gas emissions, can be very place 
specific. Policies centrally supported that, for example, advocate increased public transportation 
will work better in a dense urban core than in a rural municipality. But this distinction between 
place-appropriate policies may not be so obvious. Programs to support local upgrades of 
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buildings or purchase alternative fuel cars or increase density may have little impact in a small 
town with a tiny vehicle fleet or only one municipal building.  
However, when rural communities become engaged in sustainability actions, they can 
expand the discussion with the injection of local knowledge. One example that illustrates the 
problems when local governments are ignored is the debate over the new high volume hydro-
fracturing techniques for extracting natural gas in New York and Pennsylvania. This case 
demonstrates the critical importance of co-production of knowledge in yielding a more complete 
scientific and policy understanding of a complex issue. It also shows the need for a 
communicative co-production process within a multilevel governing framework where higher 
authority respects the diversity of interests and local knowledge across the rural landscape. 
The Marcellus Shale reserves under New York and Pennsylvania offer the promise of 
meeting much of the US energy needs for years to come. Geologists estimate the formation may 
contain up to 489 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (NYSDEC, 2012). Natural gas extracted from 
shale has a smaller carbon footprint than oil or coal (Cathles et al., 2012). New York State views 
gas drilling as a positive climate change mitigation strategy as well as an opportunity to boost the 
economically depressed rural upstate region. In 2008 the state legislature updated its compulsory 
integration law to allow gas companies to drill under private land in spacing units of 640 acres if 
60 percent of the acres in that unit are leased by landowners to the gas drilling company 
(NYSDEC, 2008). This was designed to prevent private landowners from holding out and 
blocking drilling on neighboring property.  
New York State leaders perceived drilling as important to energy sustainability, 
economic development, and equity for rural areas, but the issue turned out to be more 
complicated. Pennsylvania pushed forward with drilling while New York continued to study the 
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process and conduct environmental reviews. Between 2007 to 2010, 1,454 wells were drilled in 
33 counties of rural northern Pennsylvania. Estimates of economic impacts suggest between $2 
and $5 billion in new revenue, 29,000 construction jobs, and $240 million in state and local tax 
revenues (Considine, 2010). However, early enthusiasm for drilling has been moderated by local 
concerns over water quality (groundwater contamination and surface stream spills), truck traffic 
and impacts on road quality, and the negative social and economic impacts on housing and long-
term employment (Christopherson, 2011).  
Little understood at the beginning, at least by the public, were the implications for water 
quality. Safe groundwater is an important public health issue for rural residents, and an economic 
issue as the region’s agricultural industry is based on dairy farming, and cows require clean 
drinking water. In the hydro-fracturing process, each well uses an estimated one to six million 
gallons of water mixed with unknown chemicals (the identities are trade secrets) that frees the 
natural gas from the shale rock. The wastewater must be treated to avoid contamination of 
streams and neighboring water wells.  
Local recognition of this issue in New York has led the Conference of Environmental 
Health Directors (a statewide group of county health officials) to recommend the state ensure 
that the costs of water testing and treatment are covered by drilling fees (Riha & Rahm, 2010). 
This organization of county health departments – who hold primary responsibility for responding 
to water quality complaints – is an example of an institution that could serve the function of a 
boundary organization between state agencies and local officials. Boundary organizations 
facilitate knowledge transfers, mutual understanding, and provide space through which diverse 
perspectives can co-produce knowledge and policy (Guston, 2001). If the state would engage this 
network of county health departments, a more appropriate policy might be co-produced.  
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Wear and tear on rural roads is another example of the local economic impacts not 
considered initially. Drilling each well requires from 600 to 1,100 truckloads of water – a 
significant portion of them driving on rural roads, which were not necessarily built to handle this 
traffic load. Even paved roads, which cost up to $100,000 per mile to rebuild, cannot handle this 
kind of traffic for very long (Randall, 2010). This new knowledge has led to recommendations 
for ‘road use agreements’ and ‘haul route management’ – but local governments do not have the 
power to enter into such agreements without state approval. 
A 2013 study found 179 communities had passed restrictive legislation regarding shale 
gas extraction in New York and 60 had passed legislation in support of drilling (Frickey, 2013). 
The study found those communities passing restrictive legislation were larger, richer, more 
highly educated, and located adjacent to metropolitan areas. They also had lower trust in the 
willingness of higher levels of government to protect their local interests. Indeed, the federal 
government had specifically exempted shale gas extraction from the Safe Drinking Water Act in 
2005 (U.S. EPA, 2005).  
The top two concerns driving these local actions were water quality and road 
maintenance. By resorting to land use laws, one of their few strong local powers, these towns 
have used local legislation to inject their concerns into the debate. So far, the local drilling 
restrictions have withstood court challenges by gas drilling companies. This approach, if it 
continues, will establish a patchwork of local rules that make resource extraction inefficient 
(some drilling companies have already announced that they will pull out of the New York 
market) and may increase negative externalities, as well as hostilities, between municipalities as 
some enact tougher standards than others.  
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These town bans grew out of local public debate. Such strong debate – both pro and con – 
is forcing more study and bringing more of the conflicting scientific views to light. This is an 
example of how local engagement can broaden the framing of an issue. The challenge is to 
ensure that such discourse leads to co-production of knowledge and joint policy action. Absent 
strong state leadership in a co-production approach, the contentious debate threatens to drag on 
in an uncoordinated manner that leads local governments to act on their own. In reaction to this 
movement, the Governor of New York State has proposed a more limited “pilot” approach where 
drilling will be allowed only in the richest shale deposits and in towns that support extraction. 
This may create opportunity for more collaborative learning and policy generation, or it may just 
be a stop gap political measure that undermines coordination. New York State is still struggling 
to figure out how to co-produce policy and share power in a multilevel governance framework. 
Watershed Protection via a Co-production Approach 
Our main contention is that local government climate action is best developed through 
co-production across multiple levels of government. Our third example illustrates such a 
cooperative approach focused on watershed protection, which was piloted in Michigan and is 
now being pursued by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in other states. As with 
climate change, the issues around protecting a large regional watershed are complex and involve 
many commons issues. Just as the atmosphere is a non-excludable public good, so, for the most 
part, is a large watershed. Water pollution (both point and non-point) is a very technical 
engineering issue, which is wrapped up in a diverse variety of values represented by local 
officials, business leaders, land developers, recreational fishermen, environmental groups and so 
on. Officials at the EPA decided to “require the support of the regulated community” (U.S. EPA, 
2003, p. 2) when it sought to broaden watershed protection beyond the point-source, top-down 
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regulation of individual polluters. Federal regulators chose this co-production approach because 
they believed it would yield more efficient and innovative solutions needed to make additional 
improvements in water quality.  
In the US, the federal EPA has the authority to regulate discharges into waterways. 
Traditionally, this has been handled on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis with the agency issuing 
point-source discharge permits. Agency leaders decided to encourage a local and regional look at 
pollution across a watershed. EPA recognized watershed-wide protection of water quality as a 
collective action problem, and that the solution should involve a variety of stakeholders. Flexible 
strategies that allow a more comprehensive and sustainable solution might better address 
pollution. Administered by state and regional offices, the watershed-wide program involves 
various stakeholders, such as local governments, residents, and polluters, in an active process to 
collect information and design effluent reduction strategies that fit particular situations, but still 
meet national standards (U.S. EPA, 2003).  
One of the reasons the EPA chose the co-production approach to watershed management 
was its success in the Rouge River Watershed, which began as a pilot project in 1997. The 
watershed, in southeastern Michigan, consists of four waterways – a 44-mile long main river and 
three major branches. The watershed encompasses nearly 450 square miles with more than 1.3 
million people in 48 communities. Half of the land is urbanized, including the city of Detroit and 
surrounding suburbs, and half is rural. Water quality concerns focused at first on the 168 
combined sewer overflows that dumped polluted water into the various waterways during heavy 
rains. Over the course of the project, the issues broadened and various programs were introduced 
to correct the overflows, eliminate illegal discharges, and strengthen the system of green 
infrastructure (Garrison & Hobbs, 2011). 
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Communities came together voluntarily in the Rouge River Project as an alternative to 
imposition by federal courts of a stormwater authority that would direct the river’s rehabilitation 
in a top-down manner (U.S. EPA, 2007). Municipalities (who were also the main polluters as 
owners of the combined sewer overflows), environmental activists, and other citizens brought 
their local knowledge to multiple working groups and crafted policy solutions suitable to local 
circumstances. Seven of these advisory groups, one for each major sub-watershed, also included 
community residents, county agencies, watershed councils, and other stakeholders. A watershed-
wide steering committee oversaw the entire project and coordinated the advisory groups. The 
process garnered local support by building accountability within local power structures; it also 
included broad public education. The co-production process recognized the differences between 
urban and rural places with allowances made for smaller and rural communities within the 
watershed, which did not contribute much to the problem, to have less stringent requirements.  
This successful co-production took place within a multilevel governance framework. The 
federal government initiated and coordinated the action – and had the power to impose a solution 
if the collaboration failed. The federal government, along with the state, provided the technical 
expertise and other resources necessary to facilitate the co-production. Municipalities owned the 
polluting outfall pipes and most had the local authority to reshape development regulations to 
reduce runoff pollution.   
Environmentally, the program has been a success (Cave, 2003). Pollution from combined 
sewer overflows has been cut 90 to 100 percent during most rainstorms. Toxic chemicals are no 
longer a major concern in the river with acceptable levels of health for biological communities 
throughout the watershed. For the first time in decades, people can consume the fish caught in 
one lake of the watershed. Salmon now migrate up from the Detroit River to the headwaters of 
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the Rouge River and the number of amphibians has increased. Eventually this co-production 
watershed protection program was adopted across the State of Michigan and the EPA is now 
pursuing a similar strategy for watershed protection in other states. 
 What do these cases teach us about co-production of knowledge and policy? The first two 
cases illustrate the limits of local action and the need for a multilevel governance framework. 
While local control over land use policy in the US permits local experimentation and voice, it 
undermines regional coordination and is subject to severe capacity constraints and problems with 
externality spillovers, especially in rural areas. This suggests that while co-production of 
knowledge and policy is necessary to ensure upward information flows and local support for 
policy adoption in rural areas, local control is not sufficient to address commons issues that cross 
jurisdictional boundaries, like climate change. The second example concerning natural gas in 
New York also demonstrates the limits of top-down regulation and the need for local knowledge 
to shape policy for coordination, knowledge exchange, and sanctioning power that can enhance 
local action. The promise of a multilevel governance framework is presented in the Rouge River 
case. Federal, state, and local actors coordinate in a network approach that respects local 
knowledge and diversity, but sets a common framework of standards upon which all parties can 
act. Our goal is not to present the precise mechanisms by which such a multilevel system can be 
achieved, but rather to demonstrate that true co-production makes local governments partners in 
policy, rather than simply agents of implementation.  
 
Conclusion 
 US rural communities face difficult challenges in addressing climate change as they did 
in addressing the environmental issues used as examples here. The fragmented nature of local 
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government, local capacity constraints, and the inability to address cross-jurisdictional 
externalities threatens the efficacy of a polycentric approach to climate change policy. Relatively 
few municipalities act on their own on climate change (Boswell et al., 2011; Svara, 2011). When 
they do act, we see the potential for the same kinds of problems stemming from our first example 
about America’s fractured land use system. Independent municipal policies cause leakage, as 
industries move from place to place seeking low regulation environments, and create an 
economically ineffective patchwork of rules, duplication of efforts, confusion of responsilibities, 
and free-riding (Lutsey & Sperling, 2008). 
And yet the absence of national policy on climate change leaves local solutions as an 
important alternative. In this paper we present an approach that preserves the benefits of 
polycentrism in the co-production of knowledge and policy that is so critical to rural acceptance, 
innovation, and responsiveness to the unique nature of rural problems, while ensuring that 
externalities and capacity constraints are addressed. That solution is the articulation of a 
multilevel governance framework that creates bidirectional knowledge flows and shares power 
for sanctioning across actors in the environmental governance network. Unlike in Europe where 
some national governments have taken up the cause of climate change, the United States lacks an 
overarching governance framework. Rural communities and small towns represent the majority 
of the American landscape and thus make broadening the drive for local climate action beyond 
large urban areas represents a critical challenge.  
We envision co-production to generate knowledge and policy for local climate change 
action that involves federal, state, and municipal levels of government. The lessons from our 
three case examples lead us to think about ways in which a co-production system could be 
formed around this issue. Using our third example, of successful co-production to clean up the 
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Rouge River Watershed, we can see that the federal government plays the role of convener and 
holds the ultimate authority to compel action if dialog is not successful on ways to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. Perhaps the federal government and the states (or groups of states as 
described in the next chapter of this dissertation) co-produce legal goals and broad guidelines 
around the issue of climate change. This process would establish a framework for action. The 
states then translate this output into local action through a co-productive dialog with their 
municipalities. This would be particularly important to rural communities, which might not 
otherwise get a seat at the climate change table. To varying degrees, depending on the nature of 
the local action, the federal government and the states would provide fiscal capacity and offer 
technical assistance.  
This framework is crucial for climate change mitigation because the systems involved are 
complex, knowledge evolves rapidly, and buy-in from multiple stakeholders is required. As 
illustrated by our third example of the Michigan watershed, such an approach ties local 
knowledge from diverse rural areas to centralized expert knowledge and coordinated goals. We 
have explored issues of power, situational context, and framing, as well as coordination and the 
challenge of local enforcement across rural areas. Our examples show that framing the issue in a 
broader context and allowing co-production of knowledge and policy may facilitate more rural 
community attention to environmental issues. This offers some small promise for future positive 
movement on climate change. However, our study also demonstrates the critical importance of a 
multilevel governance framework.  
Despite its potential, co-production is not a guaranteed solution. It can involve a much 
larger commitment of resources to produce policy than simply having one handed down from a 
centralized authority (Lemos & Morehouse, 2005). There are often conflicts between local 
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stakeholders and centralized scientific experts due to diverse perspectives, values, and 
motivations (Edelenbos et al., 2011). As a collaborative process, one party who simply works to 
delay a decision can undermine it (Kraft & Johnson, 1999), although the centralized authority 
within a multilevel governane framework can ameliorate that concern. 
Designing the organizational structure for policy design and implementation requires 
attention both to the positive power of network governance and to it limitations. Polycentric 
environmental governance networks need coordination, and members need both capacity and 
power to sanction. The challenge will be to design such co-production systems so that power is 
shared and the voice and concerns of rural communities are included. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LOCAL CLIMATE CHANGE PLANNING: WILL CITIES SAVE US? 
 
Abstract 
 Climate change planning and implementation successes in cities such as New York, 
Chicago, and Boulder foster the notion that cities will lead on climate policy from the bottom up. 
The absence of federal leadership in the U.S. and a strong tradition of localism has created a 
system in which many national issues, including climate change, are left to municipalities. 
However, the reality is that few local governments undertake climate change planning. This 
study seeks to understand why some municipalities choose to act on this global commons issue. I 
use a survey of 1,841 municipalities ranging in population size from 1,997 to 741,206 to examine 
the role of state climate action plans and state-to-state regional climate change initiatives in 
creating a multilevel governance environment conducive to local action. A series of logistic 
regression models find that the likelihood of a municipality planning for climate change 
mitigation increases in a supportive multilevel governance environment. 
 Despite the hype surrounding the success of big cities and other municipal pioneers, 
policymakers cannot presume that climate mitigation planning will occur independently 
community-by-community from the bottom-up. Although current state climate action plans and 
state-to-state regional initiatives do not mandate municipal action, these governance structures 
create a political and resource environment conducive to local government climate change 
planning. I propose a new form of multistate regionalism that might establish a more effective 
local government network for climate change planning than existing voluntary municipal 
networks or traditional state-by-state efforts. 
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Introduction 
Climate change represents a global commons problem and efforts to arrive at an 
international solution among nations fall far short (Barrett, 2008; Stavins, 2010). In the absence 
of such action, a number of municipalities have undertaken greenhouse gas reduction efforts and 
have raised the possibility that this lowest level of government will lead the fight against climate 
change from the bottom up (Gore & Robinson, 2009; Kousky & Schneider, 2003). However, 
while the number of municipality-based climate action plans has grown to several hundred in the 
United States (Boswell, Greve, Seale, & Mroz-Barrett, 2011), in relationship to the thousands of 
U.S. municipalities, the proportion engaged in climate planning remains miniscule (Svara, 2011).  
In the United States, federal climate change policy focuses on industrial sectors, 
especially the reduction of emissions from coal-fired power plants and the increase in motor 
vehicle fuel efficiency (Crane & Landis, 2010).  The federal government has paid little attention 
to the climate policies of local governments and expressed only limited interest in promoting 
other sustainability goals. In 2009, the federal government announced the Partnership for 
Sustainable Communities, a multi-agency effort to craft a national vision for local sustainability, 
which includes greenhouse gas emissions reduction. Although the Partnership funded scores of 
community and regional projects, particularly to improve coordination between land use and 
transportation planning, the program suffered funding losses and failed to develop the measures 
and tools necessary to establish concrete standards (Birch & Lynch, 2012).  
Environmental regulation in the United States has traditionally been top-down with 
solutions that assume ‘one size fits all’ (Fiorino, 2010). In many cases, such an assumption is too 
crude. For example, climate policies in a dense city with public transit and walkable streets may 
make little sense (physically, culturally, or economically) in a suburb or rural community 
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dependent upon automobiles. Traditional top-down regulations typically leave little room for 
local adaptation and tend to focus on industrial processes and categories of pollution rather than 
holistic or ecosystem issues. As environmental problems have increased in complexity, top-down 
regulation has slowly yielded to more networked approaches. 
With climate change, the policy debate pits a polycentric governance approach against a 
multilevel governance framework. On most issues, notions of polycentricity and localism have 
become ingrained and are largely publicly supported (Honadle, 2001). Municipalities in the 
United States control public schools, public safety, and land development. Local governments 
also impact greenhouse gas emissions since municipalities often manage land-use, transportation 
programs, building codes, and other policies (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006). This view hypothesizes 
that local governments, on their own and in competition with each other, will adopt local 
greenhouse gas mitigation solutions that best fit their cultural, economic, and social circumstance 
(E. Ostrom, 2010). On the other hand, a multilevel approach to climate change envisions political 
authority shared among different tiers of government and across a range of public and private 
actors (Bulkeley, 2010). It is not the competition that provides effective environmental action, 
but the coproduction that occurs from a respect for local knowledge and policy innovation 
combined with a centralized source of capacity and authority to coordinate and/or coerce action 
(Homsy & Warner, 2013).  
In this paper, I examine whether or not such a multilevel governance environment would 
enhance municipal action on climate change mitigation or whether local governments do better 
operating in a local, independent manner. The federated nature of the 50 states provides a good 
laboratory for testing since each state has a different regulatory and policy environment. 
Although no states mandate municipal climate change mitigation, some states have climate 
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change plans and supportive policy frameworks, while others do not. Some states also belong to 
state-to-state regional initiatives that craft plans to mitigate greenhouse gases. In this study I find 
that a multilevel governance environment enhances the likelihood of local climate change action, 
particularly among small municipalities. In the concluding section, I offer a policy approach to 
create multistate regional frameworks to induce local government climate action. 
 
Cities and local climate change planning 
Municipalities play an important role in climate change mitigation for five reasons. First, 
cities produce a significant portion, if not the majority, of greenhouse gases (Satterthwaite, 
2008). Second, the tens of thousands of American municipalities can impact their own operations 
by building energy efficient government buildings or retrofitting old ones; they can install 
efficient street and traffic lights; some experiment with alternative energy generation (Svara, 
Read, & Moulder, 2011). Third, local governments use incentives, regulations, or other policies 
to shape private sector activities. For example, Washington, D.C., Carbondale, Colorado, and 
Huntington, New York impose green building requirements on development projects over a 
certain size (Salkin, 2009). Through land use regulations, cities can require denser, more 
efficient development or provide transportation alternatives to the private automobile (Jepson, 
2004). Fourth, municipalities can access an increasing number of national organizations and 
transnational networks (e.g. ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability, US Conference of 
Mayors) that offer technical knowledge and shape the political space for local action (Bulkeley, 
2010). Finally, cities are first responders to potential climate-caused disasters. Local responders 
are the first on and the last to leave scenes of catastrophes (FEMA, 2008).  
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Our understanding of local climate change action comes largely from research that 
examines large, urban centers or municipalities that are pioneers (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003; Kern 
& Bulkeley, 2009; Kousky & Schneider, 2003; Portney, 2013; Tang, Brody, Quinn, Chang, & 
Wei, 2010). However, in the United States, just over half of the population lives in municipalities 
with fewer than 25,000 people. Only a quarter of Americans live in the fewer than 300 cities 
with more than 100,000 residents. The reality is that most municipalities do little planning for 
climate change. A 2010 national survey finds that only 12 percent of American cities had created 
an emissions inventory or set reduction targets (Svara, 2011). A database of municipal climate 
action plans finds only 177 cities have complete plans and 220 have in-progress or otherwise 
incomplete plans (Boswell et al., 2011) among the tens of thousands of local governments in the 
United States. Smaller communities tend to lag larger ones in the adoption of general 
sustainability policies (Homsy & Warner, 2012) and need substantial technical, financial and 
planning assistance to integrate sustainability into their plans (Lubell, Feiock, & Handy, 2009).  
New York City, Chicago, Boston, Austin and other urban centers have developed 
significant plans and have made important implementation strides toward reducing their 
greenhouse gas emissions. Their actions offer the promise that municipalities can tackle the 
global commons challenge of greenhouse gas emissions from the bottom up (E. Ostrom, 2010). 
However, most communities have not begun to act on their own and many researchers of climate 
action frame effective policymaking through a multilevel governance approach (Bulkeley, 2010). 
Below I discuss the theoretical foundations for each position and some empirical results. 
Multilevel governance 
The multilevel framework emerged originally as a way to analyze and organize the new 
European Union relationship to its member states (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003). This approach 
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engages multiple tiers of government in a communicative process that requires the co-production 
of knowledge up and down levels of authority as well as a respect for local knowledge in the 
creation of place-specific policies. At the same time it recognizes the role of a central authority, 
which has technical expertise and the ability to coordinate and induce compliance through 
incentives or regulations (Homsy & Warner, 2013). Incentives and clear guidance from higher 
levels of authority provide important inducements for action (Brouwer, Rayner, & Huitema, 
2013), though the federal government rarely participates with local governments on climate 
issues (Selin & VanDeveer, 2009). An increasing number of states and U.S. regions continue to 
enact policies on climate change (H. Rabe, 2009), but most focus on industry sectors, not local 
governments (Selin & VanDeveer, 2009). State-level climate plans set goals and offer policy 
options (Wheeler, 2008), but have only reduced greenhouse gas emissions by a small amount – 
largely through green building and vehicle efficiency programs (Drummond, 2010). No states 
mandate local government action. The closest is a 2008 California law that requires urban 
regions to meet greenhouse gas reduction goals by coordinating land use and transportation 
policy (Barbour & Deakin, 2012).  
 An important feature of the multilevel governance framework is the location that 
transnational municipal networks hold within it. These networks represent efforts by localities to 
bridge political borders and function as conduits for information and best practices (Gustavsson, 
Elander & Lundmark, 2009). The volunteer networks have limited ability to govern and no 
authority to sanction, but they offer expertise, funding opportunities, and knowledge 
dissemination in such a way as to form “soft regulations” (Bulkeley, 2010, p. 237) that induce 
local action. However, these networks remain largely for pioneers with little impact on regional 
or national policies in Europe; though the most active members benefit from horizontal city-to-
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city innovation transfers  (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009). In the United States, research suggests that 
network membership by municipalities correlates to only small or moderate increases in 
greenhouse gas reduction activity (Krause, 2012). 
Some state governments in the United States have formed their own horizontal networks 
on environmental issues with varying degrees of success. Water quality in the Great Lakes was 
dramatically improved through the creation of the Great Lakes Commission and the Council of 
the Great Lakes Governors, which provided a regular forum for information flows among state 
leaders (B. Rabe, 1999). In 2001, the Conference of New England Governors and Eastern 
Canadian Premiers created a climate action plan with aggressive targets while the Western 
Governors Association established clean energy goals aimed at new technology development (H. 
Rabe, 2009). The cap and trade program run by Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the 
northeastern United States realized a net positive economic impact of $1.6 billion (Hibbard, 
Tierney, Okie, & Darling, 2011). Such networks could lead to greater emissions reductions than 
single state efforts due to greater geography and population, potential for uniformity of 
regulation, ability to capitalize on shared resources and economies, and development of a shared 
regional vision (Engel, 2005). However, these networks remain state-to-state affairs with plans 
rarely engaging local governments. 
A multilevel framework is not completely foreign to American governance; the federal 
government has experimented with cooperative federalism, in which local and state governments 
participate in the implementation of federal standards (Fischman, 2005). For example, the federal 
government, by threatening to impose top-down regulations, built a coalition of local 
governments and private actors to cut water pollution, reduce the danger of toxic chemicals, and 
improve the habitat in Michigan’s Rouge River watershed (U.S. EPA, 2007). In some cases, the 
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federal government establishes minimum standards that lower levels of government may exceed, 
resulting in more dialogue and innovation (Sovacool, 2008).  
Local control  
If multilevel governance envisions a cooperative network approach with information 
flowing up and down levels of government as well as horizontally across municipalities, local 
control represents a public choice model in which the competition for residents and businesses 
drives the provision of public goods. Metropolitan-level polycentrism arose in the 1960s, when 
V. Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961) demonstrated that some public services, such as policing 
and education, are best provided at the local level. They maintained that intermunicipal 
competition and local government’s close connection to constituents can result in cost-effective 
outcomes and local innovations. Local actors better understand local needs and thus better 
provide public goods than a higher authority (McGinnis, 1999). 
Elinor Ostrom (2010) hypothesized that this provision of public goods at the metropolitan 
region level offers a model for the governance of the global commons. She contended that a 
variety of public and private actors (including municipalities, utilities, households, firms, nations, 
etc.) will be driven by competition and local advantages to create independent solutions to 
greenhouse gas reductions using strategies best suited to the local environment, citizenry, and 
other particulars of circumstance. Diffuse local action unburdens the dysfunctional international 
climate negotiation agenda by pushing priorities onto lower levels (Rayner, 2010). Benefits of 
local independent action include: more experimentation and innovation, local tailoring of action 
to fit circumstances, political testing of policies, and local experience in enforcement.  
Recent studies indicate that some localities act independently on climate change policy 
(Krause, 2011a, 2011b; Pitt, 2010). Communities are more likely to act on their own when 
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climate change mitigation is linked to a policy already on the local government agenda (Betsill, 
2001). These co-benefits emerge in various forms: reduction in energy costs (Kousky & 
Schneider, 2003; Svara et al., 2011), increased public health (Bloomberg & Aggarwala, 2008), or 
economic development and job production (Jochem & Madlener, 2003). Such reframing of a 
global problem transforms an abstract concept to a locally tangible one (Metz & Below, 2009).  
However, municipally-driven initiatives also cause an economically ineffective 
patchwork of regulation, duplicative enforcement efforts, cross-boundary mismatches between 
pollution sources and effects, shuffling of high-carbon activities to weaker regulatory areas, and 
confusion over responsibility between levels of government (Lutsey & Sperling, 2008). Local 
stakeholders grow frustrated with the lack of coordination and express the desire for a holistic 
approach to green house gas mitigation (Greenwood, 2012).  
 
Research Method 
This paper seeks to empirically investigate the debate around the ability of local 
governments to plan for climate change. I use a broad survey of U.S. municipalities to test the 
hypothesis (HO) that municipalities will be more likely to adopt climate change policies in a 
multilevel governance framework. The alternative hypothesis (HA) states that such a framework 
will not increase the likelihood of policy adoption. In addition, I examine the role that a 
municipality’s population size plays with the secondary hypothesis (H2) that smaller places will 
benefit more from a multilevel environment than bigger cities.  
Testing such these hypotheses requires finding situations that approximate multilevel 
governance of climate change in the United States. No states mandate local government action 
on climate change, but states do have differing levels of commitment to the challenge which can 
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be measured as a more or less conducive atmosphere for policy action. In addition, numerous 
states have joined multi-state initiatives that focus on climate change mitigation. 
This project takes advantage of an extensive survey of sustainability planning and 
implementation by U.S. municipalities. The 2010 Sustainability Survey, conducted by 
International City/County Management Association,4 asked county and municipality leaders 
about their adoption of policies and programs in areas such as climate change, water quality 
protection and provision, building construction, and land use. Surveys were mailed to a sample 
of municipalities with populations of more than 2,500 people and to all counties; the overall 
response rate is 25.4 percent. This analysis focuses on the lowest level of government and, 
therefore, includes only non-county municipalities. It is further limited to communities with a 
population of fewer than 1,000,000 people. Within these parameters, managers of 7,257 local 
governments received surveys and 1,874 responded (25.8% response rate). Complete 
demographic, fiscal, and governance data was gathered for 1,841 municipalities, which 
represents the final number of local governments in my analysis. 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, climate change planning community, is based on six climate 
change planning actions that a community might undertake. This variable is dichotomous and a 
municipality receives a value of one if it reported on the survey that it has officially adopted or 
created any one or more of the following:  
• A baseline of greenhouse gas emissions produced by the local government (i.e. inventory); 
• A baseline of greenhouse gas emissions produced by the community (i.e. inventory); 
• Greenhouse gas reduction targets for local government operations; 
                                                           
4 The survey was conducted in collaboration with researchers at Arizona State University’s Center for 
Urban Innovation and ASU’s Global Institute of Sustainability. A descriptive summary of the results can 
be found in Svara (2011). 
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• Greenhouse gas reduction targets for businesses; 
• Greenhouse gas reduction targets for multi-family residences; or 
• Greenhouse gas reduction targets for single-family residences. 
Establishing a baseline of emissions for either the local government or the community is 
a major undertaking for a municipality and indicates a commitment to climate change action. 
Adoption of the various targets can be symbolic, but also indicates an official intention to 
address greenhouse gas emissions. Table 1 shows the percent of municipalities which engaged 
climate change planning communities by population size. The adoption of policies is clearly 
more prevalent among larger municipalities.  
 
Table 1 – Percent of climate change action communities by population size 
 
Population size 
Percent 
adopting 
Number 
adopting 
Total number in 
sample 
2,500 to 9,999 8.1 69 848 
10,000 to 24,999 15.2 77 508 
25,000 to 99,999 34.7 135 389 
100,000 to 499,999 49.5 45 91 
500,000 to 999,999 60.0 3 5 
Total 17.9 329 1,841 
 
Independent variables 
The independent variables and the sources of the data are described in Table 2 and are 
grouped into following subject areas. 
Multilevel variables. Two dichotomous variables examine the potential link between a 
multilevel governance framework and local government climate action. The first measures 
whether a municipality’s state has a climate action plan, which was true for 1,180 municipalities 
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in the sample. The second indicates whether the state is a member of a regional climate change 
initiative. In 2010, there were four regional initiatives (Western Climate Initiative, Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, and the Transportation 
and Climate Initiative) that covered 14 states and 535 municipalities in the sample. The main 
hypothesis would be supported by the positive correlation between these two variables and the 
increased likelihood of a municipality being a climate change action community.  
Population variables. As the descriptive statistics in Table 1 show, population size 
appears directly related to climate change planning. We use this variable to examine the 
secondary hypothesis about the role of city size and expect a multilevel environment to increase 
the odds of action more for smaller places than for larger ones. The model also includes, as 
demographic controls: population change, and population density, which have been shown to 
positively correlate with general municipal environmental policies (Krause, 2011a; Schmidt & 
Paulsen, 2009; Tang, 2009). The same is expected in the current study. 
The following variables control for the internal characteristics of communities.  
Geographic factors. Central cities are expected to have a greater likelihood of enacting 
climate change policies than either suburban or rural areas, even when controlling for population 
size and local fiscal capacity. Service spillovers from core cities could explain why some suburbs 
invest less in programs, such as affordable or higher density housing or industrial development 
(Pendall, 2000) so suburbs are hypothesized to make a lower investment in climate change 
actions. Rural areas may underperform in comparison to central cities as they suffer from 
reduced knowledge transfer from distant urban cores. 
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Table 2 – Summary statistics for variables  
 
Municipalities  
(n=1,841) 
Variables 
Mean 
(or percent ‘yes’ 
for 1/0 variables) 
St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Dependent variable     
Climate change action community a 
(1=yes) 
17.9 NA 0 1 
     
Independent variables     
Multilevel factors     
State climate planb (1=yes) 64.1 NA 0 1 
State participation in regional climate 
initiative (1=yes)b 
28.7 NA 0 1 
Population variables     
Population f  27,882 54,461 1,997 741,206 
Pop. change 2000-2010 f (percent) 13.8 31.8 -36.6 510.8 
Density f (people/sq. mile) 2096.4 1849.7 3.1 17112.4 
Control variables     
Geographic factors     
Central cities a (1=yes) 9.2 NA 0 1 
Suburban municipalities a (1=yes) 59.3 NA 0 1 
Rural communities a (1=yes) 31.5 NA 0 1 
Local politics     
City manager government a (1=yes) 62.0 NA 0 1 
Voting for Al Gore c (percent) 45.7 11.7 13.7 79.5 
Economic dependence     
Employment change 99-09 g (percent) 4.1 19.6 -57.5 178.9 
Agricultural employment d (percent) 2.7 3.8 0 27.4 
Manufact. employment d (percent) 12.5 6.1 0.7 67.1 
Local capacity     
Local govt. rev. per capita e ($) 984 949 0 18,279 
Educ. att. (bachelor plus) d (percent) 28.6 16.1 2.4 86.8 
Per capita income d ($) 27,883 12,770 6,399 124,327 
a derived from ICMA Sustainability Survey, 2010 
b Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2011 
c Lublin & Voss, 2001 
d American Community Survey, 2005-2009  
e Census of Local Governments, 2002 
f U.S. Census 2010 
g County Business Patterns, 1999-2009 
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 Local politics variables. Public administration research has found that council-manager 
forms of government enact more innovative policies (Nelson & Svara, 2012) because managers 
tend to be entrepreneurial and offer innovations that have been vetted by professional 
associations (Schneider, Teske, & Mintrom, 1995). Svara (2011) found the link between 
innovation and council-manager forms of government holds true for general sustainability 
policies. Presence of a council-manager form of government is expected to increase the odds of 
climate change planning.  
Previous research has demonstrated that political attitudes in a community impact local 
sustainability policy in general and climate change in particular (Barbour & Deakin, 2012; 
Krause, 2011a; Slavin, 2011; Zahran, Brody, Vedlitz, Grover, & Miller, 2008). The percentage 
of votes for Al Gore in the 2000 presidential election serves as a proxy for this. A positive 
correlation is expected between votes for Gore and the odds that a community will adopt climate 
change policies. Data is for the county in which the municipality sits and comes from Lublin and 
Voss (2001). 
 Dominant economic players. Environmental protection is often seen as in conflict with 
economic development (Campbell, 1996). However, some studies focusing on climate change 
show no correlation between the presence of manufacturing and climate policy action (Krause, 
2011a; Sharp, Daley, & Lynch, 2011; Zahran et al., 2008) though other studies indicate that local 
manufacturing decreases the chances that a community would act (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003; 
Gustavsson et al., 2009; Krause, 2011b). Three variables control for this in the current study. The 
first is the 1999 to 2009 change in the number of jobs within the municipality’s county, which 
represents general economic development; a negative correlation to the odds of climate action is 
predicted. The other two variables are the percentage of people employed in manufacturing and 
   90 
agriculture/extractive operations. Increased employment in these sectors is expected to decrease 
odds of a locality taking climate change action.    
 Local capacity variables. Local capacity examines the ability of a municipality to carry out 
climate change planning. Local government revenue per capita measures the ability of a 
community to raise funds through taxes and fees and thus fund policymaking and programming. 
Educational attainment (percentage of the population with a bachelor’s degree or more) is a 
measure of the potential for community members to provide volunteer expertise and human 
resources for planning climate change mitigation. Finally, per capita income has been shown to 
correlate with general sustainability policies and climate change action in particular (Sharp et al., 
2011; Zahran et al., 2008). All capacity variables are expected to positively correlate with the 
odds of a community planning for climate change mitigation.  
 
Analysis of results 
The main hypothesis, its alternative, and the secondary research question were tested 
using a series of six logistic, multilevel, random intercept models. This hierarchical approach 
accounts for the clustering of municipalities in states. The first three models include just the 
presence of a state climate action plan. Models four, five, and six also include as an additional 
factor the state’s participation in a regional initiative. The models are then differentiated by 
population size: municipalities with populations of more than 25,000 people (n=485); smaller 
communities between 2,500 and 25,000 in size (n=1,356); and the entire sample (n=1,841). The 
results of the logistic regression models are presented as odds ratios in Table 3.  
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Table 3 – Results of multilevel logistic regression 
 State climate plan State climate plan & regional initiative 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 All Large Small All Large Small 
 (n=1,841) (n=485) (n=1,356) (n=1,841) (n=485) (n=1,356) 
Multilevel variables Results presented as odds ratios 
State climate plan **2.0992 *2.0524 **2.222 *1.759 1.530 *1.993 
Regional initiative    1.597 **3.219 1.289 
Population variables       
2010 Population (logged) **1.668 *1.598 *1.547 **1.690 **1.731 *1.547 
Pop. change 2000-2010 0.999 1.000 0.997 1.000 1.001 0.997 
Density 2010 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Control variables       
Geographic factors       
Central cities Reference Reference 
Suburban municipalities *0.543 *0.504 1.520 *0.538 *0.471 1.500 
Rural communities *0.550 0.571 1.471 0.558 0.615 1.474 
Local politics 
      
City manager government 1.128 1.225 1.07 1.154 1.394 1.082 
Voting for Al Gore (percent) **1.034 *1.033 *1.029 **1.031 *1.029 *1.028 
Economic dependence 
      
Employment change 99-09  1.004 1.006 1.003 1.004 1.003 1.003 
Agricultural employment 1.013 1.076 0.994 1.017 1.081 0.995 
Manufacturing employ. 0.972 0.991 *0.952 0.974 0.996 *0.953 
Local capacity       
Local govt. rev. per capita **1.000 **1.001 **1.000 **1.000 *1.000 **1.000 
Educ. att. (bachelor plus) **1.049 **1.036 **1.053 **1.049 **1.035 **1.053 
Per capita income **1.000 **1.000 **1.000 **1.000 1.000 **1.000 
       
** indicates significance at the 0.01 level    * indicates significance at the 0.05 level 
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The results support the main hypothesis that the multilevel factors positively correlate 
with the odds that a municipality undertakes climate change planning. The first multilevel factor, 
the presence of a state climate plan, increases the likelihood of local action from 75 to more than 
200 percent in five of the six models – even though no state plan directly requires action by 
municipalities. The exception is model five, which focused on bigger places. In this model, the 
presence of a state plan proved insignificant, but the other multilevel variable, regional initiative, 
correlated to increased odds of local climate change planning by over 320 percent.5  
This result contradicts some previous research, which finds that municipalities act 
independently on this issue in a polycentric manger and that states play no role in local climate 
action (Krause, 2011a, 2011b; Pitt, 2010). Two factors might account for this divergence. First, 
the dataset in the current study is larger and broader. In her two studies, Krause (2011a, 2011b) 
only examines places with populations greater than 25,000 and 50,000 respectively; those more 
likely to act. The second factor is the difference in the construction of the dependent variables. In 
one study, Krause (2011a) uses the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement as a dependent 
variable, which requires neither the resource investment of a greenhouse gas inventory nor the 
political capital needed to officially adopt emissions reductions goals. The second Krause study 
(2011b) and Pitt (2010) employ as the dependent variable an additive index of policies which 
could reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, many of the policies (e.g. tree ordinances, 
recycling, bike lanes, public transit incentives, regional planning for growth, and encouragement 
of mixed-use/pedestrian-oriented development) need not have been undertaken with the intention 
                                                           
5 The model was also run without the presence of the multilevel variables and the results for the internal 
factors changed little in the six models. 
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of reducing emissions. Who can say whether a community’s efforts to encourage public transit, 
for example, derives from a desire to fight climate change or to reduce congestion or provide 
transportation to low-income residents? To a practitioner, these differences may not be important 
because the multiple facets broaden the pool of policy supporters. However, researchers seeking 
to study climate change planning need to make such distinctions; otherwise we are simply testing 
smart growth or general sustainability. The dependent variable in the current study is targeted to 
a community’s actions (creation of an emissions inventory) and intentions (adopted goals and 
targets) and represent specific climate change policy commitments; it offers a clear measure of 
policy intention. 
The secondary hypothesis, that smaller municipalities would benefit more in a multilevel 
environment than larger cities, is also supported with regards to state climate plans. The impact of 
a state climate plan is much stronger among small municipalities (models three and six) than 
larger ones (models two and five). However, the additional participation in a regional climate 
change initiative produces no benefit to smaller places and correlates to greatly increased odds of 
climate change planning in larger places. Smaller places may simply remain tied to states, which 
provide needed fiscal and technical capacity as well as political cover. This is an important 
difference between larger and smaller municipalities. Population change and density are not 
significant in any model. 
One of the control variables, percentage of manufacturing employment, also indicates an 
important difference between larger places, where it is not significant, and smaller places, where 
it has a negative correlation to the odds of climate change planning. In smaller communities, the 
power of such dominant players could work against greenhouse gas reduction by local 
governments as factory management and employees would hold political power. The other two 
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economic variables, employment change between 1999 and 2009 and level of agricultural 
employment, are not significant. 
Educational attainment was a significant factor in all six models and a one percent 
increase translates into a 3.5 to 5.3 percent increase in the odds that a community would plan for 
climate change. Once again, the impact was stronger in smaller communities by about 34 percent 
as these are places likely to turn to citizens for the technical capacity lacking among their staff. 
Local government revenue per capita was significant across all six models, but the size of its 
impact on climate action was almost too small to measure. Per capita income was significant in 
five of six models, but its actual impact was negligible.  
 The geographic control variables indicate that suburbs have 46 percent lower odds of 
climate change planning. This is as expected since suburbs benefit from urban spillover effects in 
many different issues (Lowery, 2000; Pastor, Lester, & Scoggins, 2009; Pendall, 2000). Rural 
places also have 45 percent lower likelihood of climate change planning. This could result from 
the lack of fiscal capacity and technical knowledge as well as the politics described as barriers to 
climate change action in these places (Carter & Culp, 2010). 
Two variables test form of government and political progressiveness. The form of 
government variable (presence of a council manager) is not significant, which is opposite of 
what was expected. Perhaps as a pioneering action, climate change planning is so new that the 
typical advantage of council-manager forms of government do not apply. Political 
progressiveness, in the form of votes for Gore in the 2000 presidential election, found that each 
percent vote for Gore consistently increases the odds of climate action by about three percent in 
all six models. 
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Policy implications 
My analysis indicates that a multilevel governance framework facilitates more climate 
change planning by local governments than the largely local approach so common among issues 
today. Some cities, particularly bigger ones, will act on their own remain pioneers of local 
climate change action, but the vast majority will do nothing independently. Unlike in Europe 
where some national governments and the European Union took up the cause of climate change 
(in word if not in deed), the U.S. lacks an overarching governance framework for municipalities. 
The challenge for practitioners and policymakers is identifying the governance structure that 
might foster the most effective multilevel framework. Regional efforts often focus on 
metropolitan areas in which municipalities have successfully coordinated to achieve affordable 
housing, economic development, open space conservation, and watershed protection goals 
(Wheeler, 2002). More broadly, states are the traditional mechanism as they possess the existing 
legal authority to structure municipal actions (Frug & Barron, 2008), though this goes largely 
unused with regards to climate change.  
Another potential approach to fostering local government climate planning builds on an 
existing supra-state structure: regional climate change initiatives. Regional coalitions of states, 
such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative or the Western Governor’s Initiative, currently 
have little interaction with municipalities, but as groups of states, the initiatives have the 
authority to provide the coordination, capacity, and policies needed to induce local government 
climate planning. The strength of these multi-state regions over metropolitan regions is their 
broader geographic scope, which can more effectively eliminate free-rider problems and reduce 
leakage that pushes polluting industry to places with weaker regulations. Many states may be too 
small geographically and economically to be effective. These multistate networks overcome the 
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weakness of transnational municipal networks as all municipalities would be members and the 
states would have the authority to induce local action. They would also have the resources 
needed to provide fiscal and technical capacity to municipalities.  
Most interestingly, these geographically regional networks would be comprised of 
municipalities more likely to share economic goals and political constituencies than the current 
voluntary transnational networks. The regional coalitions could set goals, perhaps in conjunction 
with the federal government, and states could codify those targets for their municipalities. States 
could, but need not, impose top-down regulations; they could allow local governments to 
innovate within the state/regional coalition established multilevel framework. Pioneering policies 
developed by municipalities would be immediately more relevant to other members of the 
regional coalition. For example, municipalities in the northeast could share strategies to reduce 
their natural gas emissions, while those in states that use more coal could develop outcomes for 
their specific challenges. These groupings also produce stability of membership within the 
regional initiatives. None of the nine northeastern states within the current Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative mine coal within their borders. If the coalition tried to add coal-producing 
Pennsylvania to the mix, it is likely the network would become unstable and policy innovations 
less common to all members. In some ways the boundaries of multi-state regional initiatives 
approximate a large European state with a common heritage, similar climate, and comparable 
economic situation. 
 
Conclusion 
Much has been written describing the contents and effectiveness of climate change 
planning by local governments. Less well investigated is the motivation for local action on this 
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global commons problem. My analysis of 1,841 municipalities indicates that there exists little 
internal motivation for climate change action as most communities simply have not acted on 
their own as expected by proponents of public choice theories of urban policymaking. Planners 
and other policymakers must realize that the hope for a locally-driven, bottom-up approach to 
climate change will remain limited to pioneering municipalities. Even in the absence of state 
mandates, local governments are more likely to plan for climate change when a multilevel 
governance framework creates a conducive policy environment. Smaller communities benefit 
more from state climate plans, while larger cities plan better when a multistate regional 
framework exists.  
The shared geographies, economies, and climate of states within existing regional 
initiatives may offer a new approach to multistate regionalism around the issue of climate 
change. Local government concerns over free-riders and spillovers can be controlled among 
groups of states, which have the legal authority to sanction local governments. As coalitions of 
states, these networks can set enforceable goals as well as foster and disseminate municipal 
innovations. Given the important role that municipalities should play in climate change 
mitigation, practitioners at all levels need to think creatively about ways to foster constructive 
planning and action. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
UNLIKELY PIONEERS: SMALL CITY LEADERS IN CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
Abstract 
Absent national guidance, some U.S. municipalities have enacted greenhouse gas 
reduction policies. These actions provide the opportunity to examine why local governments act 
on global commons issues. Two approaches are tested: public choice theory, which argues that 
municipalities act based upon internal drivers, and multilevel governance, which frames local 
policies as arising from both internal and external factors. In this study of twelve smaller 
municipalities, deemed “unlikely pioneers” because they acted on climate change against the 
odds, the results show support for both theories. Public entrepreneurs spearhead climate policies 
independently by reframing global issues with an internal focus, but fiscal capacity limits 
response. Multilevel governance is found in places with municipally-owned utilities, which face 
top-down regulation to reduce emissions. However, these municipalitis have more access to 
capacity that enables action. Leaders in both groups describe the importance of regional or 
statewide networks for support, but not citizen engagement in motivating action.  
 
Introduction!
Local government officials tend to focus on issues that impact their constituents. These 
include demands for newer and better services, lower taxes, economic growth, quality of life, and 
protection of property values (Schneider, Teske, & Mintrom, 1995). Decisions made by local 
leaders are short-term and locally-focused, which is not surprising given the length of the 
political and budgetary cycles. Given this internal focus, it makes little sense for municipalities 
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to enact climate change mitigation policies on their own (Kousky and Schneider 2003). 
Integrating such global issues into municipal policy can be complex (Bai, 2007) as local action 
requires incurring costs today to tackle a problem with benefits that may not be realized for 
decades and which may be diffuse around the world leading to a classic tragedy of the commons 
(Hardin, 1968).  
Yet municipalities do have responsibility and opportunities to act. Some research finds 
cities responsible for 50 to 75 percent of carbon emissions (Satterthwaite, 2008; Stern, 2006). 
American local governments have control over tens of thousands of municipal buildings, fleets 
of local government vehicles, streets lights, traffic lights, and other sources of greenhouse gas 
emissions. Also, local governments can use incentives, regulations, or other policies to shape 
private sector activities, including imposing green building requirements, increasing residential 
and commercial density, or providing transportation alternatives to cars. Finally, the close 
connection that municipalities have with businesses and residents gives them an important 
educational function as role model (Collier, 1997).  
Some local government pioneers have chosen to take on the challenges of climate change 
mitigation. For example, a 2010 survey of local governments found that 22 percent try to 
conserve energy in vehicle fleets and outdoor lights; 12 percent have inventoried greenhouse gas 
emissions or set reduction targets; and five percent offer energy audits to private businesses 
(Svara, 2011). While several hundred municipalities have created and adopted climate change 
action plans (Boswell, Greve, Seale, & Mroz-Barrett, 2011), there are tens of thousands of local 
governments in the United States and the vast majority does nothing (Svara 2011). 
Local government policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions came in two waves of 
urban governance (Bulkeley, 2010). The first, beginning in the early 1990s, were efforts by 
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pioneers, such as Toronto, Leicester, Munich, and Frankfurt, which created climate change 
mitigation policies based on existing energy conservation. These cities were also the first to form 
networks that evolved into ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability, the Climate Alliance, 
and others. The second wave, dating from the early 21st century, centered on these municipal 
networks, which had matured. Many were now nationally organized; they included private sector 
actors and a more diverse range of cities. Environmental protection regulations in the United 
States traditionally have been handed down to municipalities from higher levels of government 
(Fiorino, 2006). The lack of similar guidance for climate change mitigation and the initial action 
among municipalities offer the hope that local governments can tackle this global commons 
challenge from the bottom up (E. Ostrom, 2010; Rayner 2010). 
The current research seeks to understand why local governments act on global commons 
issues and to add to the literature on theories of municipal policymaking. My research focuses on 
communities – “unlikely pioneers” – who were not expected to act on climate change issues, but 
then did. I use interviews with local leaders and a review of planning documents in twelve of 
these communities to understand whether climate change mitigation policy arises from internal 
factors in an independent, polycentric manner or derives from a more multilevel governance 
approach. This project contributes to a broader understanding of local policy emergence around 
issues of global commons because most research on local climate change drivers and policies 
examines large, urban centers (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009; Kousky & 
Schneider, 2003; Portney, 2013; Tang, Brody, Quinn, Chang, & Wei, 2010). While important, 
such an agenda is incomplete. The vast majority of municipalities in the United States are small 
with just over half of Americans living in communities of fewer than 25,000 people and with less 
than one-third residing in the mere 313 American cities with more than 100,000 residents.  
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Among these unlikely pioneers, I find that public policy entrepreneurs push climate 
action by shaping local agendas in ways that can address global concerns. Some of the local 
leaders in my sample are driven by internal factors, including cost savings, competition for 
economic development, threat of climate change’s impact, and personal ethics. In most cases, 
these leaders face capacity constraints to ongoing action. Officials in other municipalities are 
pushed by the external regulations imposed on them indirectly through their municipally-owned 
utilities. These leaders were able to (or sometimes required to) use some of the utility revenue for 
energy conservation and greenhouse gas reduction programs. Leaders in both groups of 
communities relied on professional networks for technical knowledge with established 
sustainability networks less important. Surprisingly, citizens action did not play an important role 
in initiating action in these pioneering communities. 
 
Theories of local policy emergence and climate change!
In this section, I review two main groups of policymaking theories at the local 
government level. The internal, polycentric theories are policy entrepreneurship and public 
choice. Then I review theories of less individualistic drivers of action: top-down governance, 
institutional collective action, and multilevel governance. Finally, I touch on the literature that 
describes the importance of local government capacity to policy action. 
Individual action by municipalities 
Pioneering climate change efforts in municipalities are often driven by individual local 
officials (Bulkeley 2010). Such policy entrepreneurship is an internal theory of action that 
involves local officials recognizing and seizing opportunity for change within a community 
(Page, 2006). These leaders transform social perceptions in order to generate need and then meet 
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that need through a new policy (Schneider, Teske, & Mintrom, 1995). Top leadership does not 
have to drive local climate policy, but it must be supportive (Bassett & Shandas, 2010; Young, 
2010). For example, Denver’s early adoption climate change mitigation can be traced to a staff 
person in the city’s Department of Health who recognized the confluence of city goals with early 
urban climate efforts; other municipal officials soon found ways to shape programs to support 
the mayor’s vision of the city as an environmental leader (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003).  
Clever policy entrepreneurs push climate change mitigation when it is linked to a policy 
already on the local government agenda; it becomes a “co-benefit” (Betsill, 2001). At the state 
level, policy entrepreneurs have had success connecting climate policies to long-term economic 
opportunities (Rabe, 2004). Communities can invest in energy conservation to save money 
locally while the broader public good of reducing greenhouse gas emissions is also served 
(Kousky and Schneider, 2003). Co-benefits also emerge in forms such as increased public health 
(Bloomberg & Aggarwala, 2008), sustainable economic development and local job production 
(Jochem & Madlener, 2003), or local impact of climate change (Zahran 2008). Dannevig, 
Hovelsrud, and Husabø (2013) found local leaders crucial in pushing climate change adaptation 
in Norwegian cities.  
The competition for economic development or residential growth is the focus of public 
choice theory (Fischel, 2001; Tiebout, 1956). Intermunicipal competition and local government’s 
close connection to constituents can result in cost-effective outcomes and local innovations. 
Local actors better understand local needs and thus provide for local public goods better than a 
higher authority (McGinnis, 1999). Such a competitive approach to resource allocation envisions 
municipalities using strategies best suited to the local environment, citizenry, and other particulars 
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of local circumstance. Elinor Ostrom (2009, 2010) hypothesized that this manner of public goods 
provision at the metropolitan region offers a model for the governance of the global commons. 
Citizen activism can be an important internal factor driving decision making. Citizen 
activism has been shown to be positively correlated to local government action on sustainability 
issues (O’Connell, 2009; Portney, 2013; Portney & Berry, 2010; Ramírez de la Cruz, 2009; 
Svara et al., 2011; Zahran et al., 2008). Citizen-led movements are the primary reason that 
suburbs have moved towards protecting the environment and quality of life and away from 
economic growth (Berry, 1999; Gendron & Domhoff, 2009). Community-based planning and 
stewardship promotes ecological understanding and improves the local environment (Shandas & 
Messer, 2008). The local knowledge and perspective of stakeholders focuses policies and 
increases the support for policies in the community (Martin & Richards, 1995). When the public 
is engaged in problem solving, more innovative community policies result (Fung, 2008). 
Top-down, institutional collective action, and multi-level governance 
Local government action on climate change challenges the basic economic notion that 
individuals (in this case individual local governments) would not act to protect common pool 
resources. Therefore environmental protection efforts have traditionally involved regulations 
promulgated from the top-down. Such a centralized rule structure leaves little room for local 
discretion (Fiorino, 2006) and frustrates efforts to tackle complex problems (Kettl, 2002). 
Command and control regulations provide little flexibility for adjusting regulations of commons 
problems to specific local circumstances (Mazmanian, 1999).  
One alternative to a command and control approach is institutional collective action 
which argues that municipalities self-organize in various ways around environmental protection 
(Feiock, 2004). When spillover benefits of such collaboration outweigh the transaction costs of 
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forming new institutions, communities have a strong incentive to work together through a series 
of voluntary associations on issues, including economic development, environmental protection, 
or other commons goals.  
A third alternative has emerged in the form of multilevel governance, which involves 
multiple tiers of government engaged in a communicative process among public and private actors 
(Kern & Bulkeley, 2009). The advantage of a multilevel framework stems from the co-
production of both knowledge and policy from the top down as well as the bottom up (Homsy & 
Warner, 2013). The number and diversity of local climate change mitigation policies arising 
among Swedish municipalities is likely to have national impacts (Gustavsson, Elander, & 
Lundmark, 2009) although climate change adaptation at the local level in Europe benefits from 
centralized incentives and technical guidance (Brouwer, Rayner, & Huitema, 2013). Multilevel 
governance may include voluntary transnational municipal networks that create a kind of 
municipality-to-municipality form of self-governance (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009), though, in the 
United States, research suggests that network membership correlates to only small or moderate 
decreases in greenhouse gas emissions (Krause, 2012).  
While such formalized networks of professionals can advance the knowledge and 
interests of members, they can also slow innovation by creating an orthodoxy of accepted 
knowledge or best practices (Wolf, 2008). Collaborative processes may require large investments 
in coordination and are subject to many challenges including power struggles, turf battles, and 
expectations of resource contributions (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Kettl, 2002; Kraft & 
Johnson, 1999). The key to success lies in creating relationships among leaders (Stoker, 2006) 
and communication to establish inter-municipal relationships and promote knowledge diffusion.  
 
   111 
Local government capacity 
Budget is a primary concern for local action. Financial resources enable policy action and 
these resources include funding and technical skills (Thompson, 1965). Local government 
capacity is limited and each municipality must respond to its citizenry (Peterson, 1981; Tiebout, 
1956). To add services, such as environmental protection, local governments must have the 
capacity to seize new opportunities (Watson, 1997) and, as the problems become increasingly 
complex, the need for capacity increases (Honadle, 2001).  
Local officials note lack of capacity in terms of insufficient funding, technical expertise, 
and/or staff time hinders climate efforts (Pitt & Randolph, 2009). Fiscal stress leads to reduced 
implementation of climate change policy (Homsy, 2013). General sustainability action rises in 
communities with better fiscal health (Lubell, Feiock, & Handy, 2009), though wealthy 
communities and bigger cities also face budget constraints that limit climate change action 
(Bulkeley & Kern, 2006; Holgate, 2007). A majority of big cities (more than 50,000 in 
population) apply for sustainability grants while less than half have a regular budget line for 
sustainability (Wang, Hawkins, Lebredo, & Berman, 2012). The fact that most municipalities in 
the United States are unable or unwilling to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions (Svara, 2011) 
draws attention to the compelling question of why some places do act.  
 
Methodology!
Selection of municipalities 
This study builds from a prior statistical analysis of the factors related to local 
government planning for climate change mitigation (Homsy, 2013) using the results of a 2010 
national survey of local sustainability policy adoption (Svara, 2011). Local officials were asked 
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if their municipalities had undertaken a greenhouse gas inventory or set targets for emissions 
reductions for government operations or the community. The multilevel, logistic regression 
model uses the responses from 1,841 urban, suburban, and rural municipalities to examine 
whether certain economic, fiscal, demographic or governance factors correlate to increased or 
decreased likelihood of such climate change policy action. The results are summarized in Figure 
5. They show that population size, liberal voting, higher education attainment, per capita income, 
and presence of a state plan are positively correlated with increased odds of climate change 
action. If the state in which a municipality sits is part of a state-to-state climate initiative (e.g. the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative) then the likelihood of local action increases, but only for 
larger cities. In small communities, economic dependence on manufacturing decreases the odds, 
while the presence of a citizen commission dedicated to sustainability increases them. 
 
Figure 5 – Model of communities that undertake climate change action  
 
(Data source: Homsy 2013) 
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This paper examines the regression residuals from the prior study to identify 
municipalities with the lowest expectation of action. From this list, I focused on those 
communities who acted despite the lower odds of doing so. This approach of examining deviant 
communities allows me to extend theoretical frameworks of policymaking into smaller 
municipalities, which are more typical of U.S. local governments than big cities. This analysis 
also provides for a more representative understanding of the challenges facing local leaders who 
choose to act on global commons issues. Of the 18 communities contacted, officials in 12 agreed 
to be interviewed, four refused outright, and two did not respond to repeated requests.  
As shown in Table 4, the communities in the sample included communities in Alaska, 
Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Texas, Utah, and 
Wisconsin. (Two communities were from Wisconsin.) I did not offer confidentiality to the 
interview subjects, but I have not attributed particular quotes to specific people or places. Data 
consisted of interviews with the city manager, environmental officer, or other official as well as 
document data (e.g. land use or economic development plans, news reports, etc). 
  
Table 4 – Descriptive statistics of communities 
Name State Population Metro status 
Per capita 
income 
Percent w/ 
college degree 
City of Homer Alaska 5,003 Rural $32,035 33.7 
City of South Daytona Florida 12,252 Suburb 21,793 14.7 
City of West Liberty Iowa 3,736 Rural 16,502 17.5 
City of Roseville Michigan 47,299 Suburb 21,240 10.6 
City of Sleepy Eye Minnesota 3,599 Rural 21,883 14.7 
City of Kearney Nebraska 30,787 Rural 22,125 36.2 
Town of Enfield New Hampshire 4,582 Rural 26,871 6.2 
City of Loveland Ohio 12,081 Suburb 32,024 39.3 
City of Forest Hill Texas 12,355 Suburb 15,651 11.4 
City of Hurricane Utah 13,748 Suburb 21,650 20.5 
Village of Howard Wisconsin 17,399 Suburb 26,222 23.8 
City of Columbus Wisconsin 4,991 Rural 27,610 24.7 
Sources: 
2010 
Census 
ICMA 
survey 
(2010 5-year American 
Community Survey) 
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I spoke with 15 people in the 12 communities, which are briefly described below. All 
contacts started with the city manager as the person who would have broad knowledge of 
policymaking in the municipality and the power of agenda setting. Sometimes I was offered 
another official in lieu of or in addition to the city manager. The interviews were conducted over 
the phone in the fall of 2012 and lasted from 30 to 60 minutes. All interviews were recorded and 
professionally transcribed for coding and analysis. Interview data were supplemented by review 
of additional documents obtained from the interview subjects or on community websites. The 
quotes in this paper have been edited for clarity. !
The twelve communities in the sample and their initiatives on climate change are 
described below. 
Homer, Alaska. The coastal community sits 125 miles south of Anchorage with an 
economy driven by tourism and natural resources. The city drafted a climate change plan in 2007 
that created a baseline inventory of emissions and set a goal of a 20 percent reduction in 
emissions (from 2000 levels) by 2020. The city’s 2011 economic development plan specifically 
refers to the economic impact of the changing climate, which could be, for example, positive as 
temperature warms and the Alaskan growing season lengthens. Most mitigation measures are for 
government operations and the city received a state award for reducing energy costs at its sewage 
treatment plant by 20 percent. The new town center plan embraces smart growth principles and 
includes the installation of wind turbines. In Homer, I interviewed the city manager. 
South Daytona, Florida. The mayor of South Daytona spearheaded sustainability efforts. 
(This mayor passed away suddenly in April 2010.) The city is the first in northern Florida to 
achieve a gold recognition as a green city by the Florida Green Building Coalition. One of the 
main challenges described in the city’s 2011 sustainability plan is the threat of a 6.5 foot rise in 
   115 
sea levels due to climate change. The city inventoried its emissions in 2009 and set greenhouse 
gas reduction goals of a 20 percent from 2008 levels by 2021 and 25 percent by 2031. In South 
Daytona, I interviewed the parks and recreation director and the redevelopment director.  
West Liberty, Iowa. West Liberty sits halfway between Iowa City and Muscatine and is 
home to West Liberty Foods, a meat processing plant formed by a collaborative of turkey 
farmers. The majority of the population (52%) is Latino. The city has undertaken climate action 
due to regulation on its municipal utility. The utility produces its own power through a natural 
gas / diesel dual powered generator. It produced enough electricity to support the entire 
municipality with excess to sell back to the grid. In West Liberty, I interviewed the city manager. 
Roseville, Michigan. Roseville is a blue collar, inner ring suburb of Detroit and has 
rapidly dropping property values. The city undertook an inventory of greenhouse gas emissions 
of its own operations in order to qualify for grants from the Southeast Michigan Regional Energy 
office. They used the funds to install energy efficient streetlights as well as to retrofit city 
buildings to increase energy conservation. I spoke with the recently retired city manager. 
Sleepy Eye, Minnesota. Sleepy Eye has a municipally-owned utility, which produces 
some power and purchases the rest on the open energy market through a regional consortium. 
The utility is required by state law to decrease emissions by 1.5 percent annually until 2025 
through energy conservation. They spend about $125,000 per year on energy saving projects 
throughout the municipality. They also have a renewable energy requirement that gradually 
increases to 25 percent by the year 2025. I spoke with the city manager and the director of public 
works, who oversees the municipal utility. 
Kearney, Nebraska. Rising gasoline prices sparked Kearney’s interest in sustainability 
and the city purchased an all-electric vehicle to replace a full-size pickup truck in the parks 
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department. The city has inventoried energy use in all municipal buildings, changed traffic lights 
to more energy efficient fixtures, and is upgrading streetlights. They are members of the 
Nebraska Clean Cities Coalition. In Kearney, I spoke with the assistant city manager.  
Enfield, New Hampshire. Enfield is a largely rural community, which just installed its 
first stoplight. The town is adjacent to Hanover, New Hampshire, home of Dartmouth College. 
Enfield has an energy committee that is charged with finding ways to reduce energy costs. Their 
major project so far has been to audit energy use in the town hall. A new heating system saved 
significant money, but other projects, such as replacing the leaky windows have stalled due to 
costs. I spoke with the town manager and the chair of the Enfield Energy Committee.  
Loveland, Ohio. Loveland is a suburban community in the Greater Cincinnati area with 
Ohio’s first State and National Scenic River, the Little Miami, running through it. The city has 
adopted a sustainability policy that establishes a general goal of reducing carbon emissions, but 
set no specific targets. The city recently signed a letter of intent with a developer to build 92 
units of energy-efficient luxury apartments on municipally-owned land that the city hopes will 
produce enough on-site energy for residents. The city is also discussing putting a solar array atop 
a capped landfill. I spoke with the city manager of Loveland. 
Forest Hill, Texas. Forest Hills is a suburb of Fort Worth. Most of the city’s residents 
(49%) are African-American and 38 percent are Latinos. The city has done the least in the 
sample of twelve in terms of climate change or sustainability. Their municipal master plan has a 
rudimentary section on energy conservation. The city has issued a permit for green residential 
buildings by a private developer, but the project has run into funding issues related to the bad 
economy. I spoke with the city manager. 
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Hurricane, Utah. Hurricane sits in southwestern Utah near the border with Nevada and 
Arizona. A conservative community, climate change action comes to the city by virtue of its 
ownership in a municipal utility, which is fueled by a combination of coal (41%), natural gas 
(44%), hydroelectric (13%) and wind (2%) at generation stations located around the region. 
Among the cutting-edge programs the city-owned utility allows residents to monitor their electric 
usage on-line and get a free energy analysis. The utility also allows net metering so that residents 
can install solar panels or wind turbines and sell excess power to utility. I spoke with Hurricane’s 
city manager. 
Howard, Wisconsin. Howard is a suburban community of Green Bay. The city has a 
citizen commission that investigates energy saving strategies for the municipality and gives 
awards to local businesses and organizations that green their operations. The city is seeking a 
developer for a dense residential development on city-owned land that takes advantage of ground 
source heat technology. They have an application before the state to undertake tax increment 
financing for the project. I spoke with the city manager. 
Columbus, Wisconsin. The city of Columbus has an aggressive policy towards 
sustainability and energy conservation. The city applied for a grant that led to the hiring of a joint 
economic development and energy sustainability director. Among the city’s conservation 
projects includes the conversion of all street lights to energy efficient LED technology, 
installation of charging stations for electric and hybrid vehicles in public parking lots, the 
purchase of three electric vehicles for the municipal fleet, and a series of incentives offered to 
utility customers to promote conservation. In Columbus, I spoke with both the city manager and 
the director of sustainability/economic development. 
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Results and Analysis 
The data indicate that municipalities fell into two main categories with regards to climate 
change action. The first set have entrepreneurial leaders that initiate climate change action by 
shaping the local agenda and by prioritizing the local, internal benefits. The second set is pushed 
by external regulations imposed on their municipally-owned utilities. The local governments in 
each group are shown in Table 5. In this section, I first review the data results for each group and 
then examine the role of inter-municipal networks and citizen activism across both groups. 
 
Table 5 – Categorization of drivers of municipal climate change action  
Group 1 – Public entrepreneurship Group 2 – Regulation on municipal utilities 
Homer, Alaska West Liberty, Iowa 
South Daytona, Florida Sleepy Eye, Minnesota 
Roseville, Michigan Hurricane, Utah 
Kearney, Nebraska Columbus, Wisconsin* 
Enfield, New Hampshire  
Loveland, Ohio  
Forest Hills, Texas  
Columbus, Wisconsin  
Howard, Wisconsin  
* Columbus has a municipal utility, but city officials maintain that the utility acts largely as an enabler 
of action. Other drivers motivate the leadership to adopt sustainability policies. 
 
Group 1 – Public entrepreneurship 
 In this group, elected mayors or appointed city officials initiated the development of 
climate change policy. In every case, the public entrepreneur links the global commons issue to 
another priority on the local agenda in order to reframe climate change to broaden the base of 
support as described by this municipal manager.  
We can hit both parties at the same time as long as we properly phrase 
the program. When we do talk about energy audits it’s in that world where, 
yeah we know that this is climate change-ish, but we’re really concerned about 
saving money and the climate change impact that this may have is the side 
benefit to it. 
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Saving money, by reducing energy consumption, is the most common local priority and 
was mentioned as a driver of climate action in 11 of the 12 communities. The public officials 
describe the need to maintain low tax rates and protect budget efficiency, either as part of their 
own management philosophy or at the urging of elected officials.  
I could tell you, yeah, there is a part of me who is a grandfather of three 
and I see that we need to do this from a moral standpoint. But from a city 
manager standpoint in an inner ring suburb with property values dropping 40 
percent, you’re looking to save a buck anywhere you can. 
 
Most of the respondents described retrofitting municipal buildings, upgrading street and 
traffic lights, or purchasing fuel efficient vehicles as ways that climate change mitigation in the 
form of energy conservation could save money. Public officials cast all of these energy saving 
policies as fiscally responsible ones.  
 There’s a very key line in [our sustainability policy] that talks about 
fiscal responsibility. That was really the important piece to our community. We 
are fiscally conservative. That was the key point. We want to look at 
sustainability; we want to focus on that and we want to do it in a budget-
neutral or a budget-friendly manner. 
 
At the same time, fiscal constraints are described as the biggest barrier to local climate 
change action. Budgets are often the most important management tool available to local officials 
and provide insight into the choices made by local government leaders. Budgets and setting tax 
rates are an annual affair in most communities; in addition, elections take place every two to four 
years. Most public officials in the sample report that the cost concerns result in elected officials 
making short-term, locally-focused choices.  
Councils are, by nature, very conservative in regards to what they want 
to try unless there is almost a guarantee. They wouldn’t have let me, for 
example, spend $135,000 [for energy efficiency] out of the capital projects 
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budget at a time they are laying off people, even though it would save money 
on utilities down the road. Without a grant, they weren’t going to do that. 
 
This reliance on external funding raises doubts that climate change mitigation and energy 
conservation projects would be sustainable in the long-term. Grant monies have funded the 
easiest, most cost-effective projects, but they may dry up or the investments may start to reap 
smaller rewards in the future. 
Competitive pressures for economic development that increases local tax revenues were 
mentioned by three managers as an important reason to undertake climate change action and it 
was the primary reason described by this manager.  
When I came here, economic growth had been pretty flat; they’d lost 
employers. One of the challenges the council gave to me is that, ‘we’d like to 
see you go out there and see if you can turn the community around.’…  
[Our state] is pretty conservative. The state government doesn’t give us a 
local option sales tax and we don’t have any property tax abatement, which are 
tools communities have in other states… What we did was try to differentiate 
ourselves by using energy sustainability, the green movement, and embracing 
that in order to attract economic development. 
Interviewer: How well has that worked? 
People come to town, and the first thing we ask is, ‘Why do you want 
to come here?’ [They respond,] ‘Hey, you’re driving a brand new 2012 Chevy 
Volt, the electric car plug-in. How many communities do that?’ It’s makes [us] 
competitive and gives us a media edge or economic edge or an attitude edge 
over other communities. 
 
In this case, the city manager specifically used a sustainability grant (from a utility) to 
hire a single point person to oversee both sustainability and economic development. The fact that 
it was grant money initially eased the concerns of elected officials who were hesitant to try new 
and costly things. In the 12 months preceding the interview, the economic/sustainability director 
reports recruiting $31 million dollars of private sector capital investment, including industrial, 
commercial, and a $5 million affordable housing complex that had considered several other 
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communities around the state. Other successes include finding grants to purchase a plug-in 
hybrid vehicle and upgrading streetlights with high efficiency lamps. The person hired for the 
position navigates the dual sustainability and economic development roles so well that when the 
initial grant ran out, the city council allocated general funds for the position. 
Another official explains that their local climate change action is less about standing out 
from the crowd, as in the previous case, and more about meeting the minimum requirements of 
the high-tech companies that the municipality seeks to attract.  
Our city council has made it a policy priority to work on sustainability, 
primarily for economic development purposes. [We] actively recruit 
technology companies and that’s been very important to them, to see what 
we’re doing as a city and as a community on sustainability. We want to make 
sure that it’s very, very visible and that we can easily show a potential investor 
that we are working on these issues here. 
Interviewer: Have you seen any results from that yet? 
Official: We have. Some smaller companies have made initial 
investments and we’re one of two finalists for a billion dollar data center. It 
was very important to them to see what we were doing and how interested is 
the community in sustainability. 
 
Competition for economic development is a strong internal driver among many U.S. 
municipalities and framing climate change action in this way can be an economic development 
selling point. One manager says that their sustainability agenda explains “maybe 50 percent [of 
our success]. I can’t attribute everything to it. There’s still location and there are other 
community attributes that attract business here.”  
Another internal factor mentioned by two city officials was the local impact of climate 
change, especially extreme weather. These impacts, particularly when the shifts affect economic 
activity, can create a political atmosphere conducive to climate change policymaking.  
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We’re concerned that we are definitely seeing changes in the climate, 
more frequent storms and pests, like the spruce bark beetle that haven’t 
happened for many years, but are devastating forests around here. 
 
This community is engaged with locally-based federal research centers about the 
potential impacts of sea level rise and other changes to the natural resource economic base, such 
as forests and fisheries, in an effort to better understand greenhouse gas emissions reduction and 
develop adaptation strategies. Another manager presented a broader scenario, but one in which 
weather changes still shaped the discourse.  
The discussion has been along these lines. We had the mildest winter in 
memory. There were very few snowstorms, very little snow plowing or 
disruption from winter weather. Then we had a drought, which is causing all 
kinds of issues related to the death of trees. Republicans and Democrats alike 
love our urban canopies. When there’s discussion of climate change, it’s these 
unseasonable seasons that we’re having that make people stand up and ask, 
‘what’s going on?’ 
 
Interestingly, many of the communities in this study experienced the drought and heat 
described above without generating local reaction. Local impacts related to economic 
development spurred more action than local impacts related to weather. Whether climate 
catastrophes, such as Hurricanes Katrina or Sandy, which also have enormous economic 
consequences, spur action is a question for future research. 
Eight of the officials interviewed indicated their personal belief in the need for action on 
climate change as an important reason for climate change mitigation policies in their 
communities. Most managers describe insinuating climate issues into the policy agenda when the 
opportunity presents itself.  
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I’ve always thought it was a very, very important issue. There’s no 
doubt. When I was first hired, that wasn’t the top priority on the agenda. The 
city council had all kinds of other things they wanted me to address and the 
climate change thing sort of evolved over time. 
 
Another official attributes local climate policy to his professional ethics. “It’s my 
personal belief and conviction that as manager, this city, and any organization that I work with, 
should reduce its environmental impact.” This city manager takes full credit for initiating climate 
change policies in his community. But his enthusiasm does not give him a free hand; he must sell 
action to his elected officials on the basis of budget savings.  
Group 2 – Municipal utility driven 
In the second group of municipalities, three of the local governments act on the issue of 
climate change because the municipality owns an electric utility, which faced external regulation. 
A fourth city (Columbus, Wisconsin) had a municipal utility, which faced external regulation, 
but local leaders say their push for sustainability had other drivers. Some of these local utilities 
are power producers while others buy energy and resell it to their residents and local businesses. 
The role of municipally owned utilities was surprising and offers additional insights on factors 
that drive climate action, especially within a multilevel governance framework.  
Local officials describe three roles the municipal utility play in local climate change 
action. The first and most important is that they are subject to regulation which forces attention 
to emissions and conservation. In some cases these regulations are imposed by the federal 
government; in others it is the state government that compelled action. One municipal manager 
describes federal regulations as forcing them to upgrade a power plant to reduce emissions. 
Another manager reports that all utilities in the state, including municipally-owned ones, must 
invest a certain amount of their revenue every year into energy conservation and renewable 
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energy efforts. Despite his strong personal belief in energy conservation, he admits, “I’ll be 
honest. If we weren’t required to do this, we wouldn’t be this aggressive.” One local government 
has to meet state requirements for green energy purchases by its municipally-owned utility.  
The second role that these municipal utilities play involves providing fiscal capacity to 
the local government. Whether by mandate or as a local initiative, in three of the four 
municipalities with utilities, the excess in fees generated over production and distribution costs is 
used, in part, to fund energy conservation programs. Usually, the top-down regulations on the 
utilities did not require that specific kinds of conservation take place; the energy policies were 
shaped by local officials. Some local governments used the money for energy conservation 
efforts in municipal buildings or fleets while others sought to help local residents or businesses.  
The third function of municipal utilities has been to sensitize local officials to the climate 
change issue. 
Interviewer: You say you have an energy conscious council. What 
makes them energy conscious? 
Part of it is because we are a community that has our own municipal 
utilities. We have a pretty progressive energy program in the state, we have 
goals we have to meet... It makes us all pretty conscious of those types of 
things. I think the council is just aware of the issues more because we have our 
own electric utility. 
 
Inter-municipal networks and citizen action 
Networks prove important to the public officials interviewed in both groups. Most 
frequently mentioned are regional and statewide networks. In one state, the alliance is among 
suburbs in a metropolitan area. In another, the manager reports that his staff had just returned 
from a conference and he expected to soon hear what his team had learned about sustainability. 
In another state, five municipalities created a small network dedicated to climate change. In 
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another, suburban communities have an association that deals with general municipal issues and 
the association applies for and administers grant money used by municipalities for energy 
conservation.  
Surprisingly public officials in both groups did not see citizens or citizen activism as a 
major benefit or obstacle. Only one manager reported that citizens had an initiating role in 
climate action. In most of the interviews, citizens were not portrayed as a factor and sometimes 
citizen activists hindered the adoption of staff-supported climate change policies.  
Instead, residents are portrayed in some communities by officials as creating an overall 
progressive or environmental ethic that allows local leaders to act on environmental issues 
without encountering much resistance. In other places, the environmental feelings are more tied 
to the use of nature or natural heritage.  
You don’t have to drive very far until you’re in nature. We have a lot of 
sportsmen and they actually are better stewards of the environment than a lot 
of people give them credit for. The responsible sportsmen are a good asset; the 
fishermen are a good asset. 
 
Discussion!
The results of this study support both an internal public choice theory of action and a 
multilevel governance one. First, policy entrepreneurs in Group 1 municipalities undertake 
action on global issues when it fits their local agenda. As in studies of larger places, the officials 
use sustainability to advance other local priorities and, in that way, broaden the coalition of 
supporters. Most often that local priority is cost savings although economic development is also 
shown to be an important internal driver for public entrepreneurs.  
However, these entrepreneurial officials need outside funding to launch and sustain their 
efforts. Even when the policy or program offers an important co-benefit, such as fiscal savings, 
   126 
officials were reluctant to invest in energy conservation and climate change action. And, most of 
the leaders stated that they could make few advances without outside help. The startup cost of 
energy conservation technology, even if there is an eventual payback, is a significant barrier to 
action in smaller places. Policy entrepreneurs need to find ways to make climate change a local 
priority, but also find sources of funding for policymaking and implementation. 
Local budgets and fiscal capacity, therefore, play dual roles with regards to climate 
change action. The promise of cost savings and efficiencies can be a powerful instigator for a 
public entrepreneur. However, with community leaders reluctant to invest their own funds in 
energy conservation, the budget is a significant barrier. Independent action by municipalities, at 
least among the smaller places examined in this study, is limited by resource needs and thus 
action is tied to a greater network involving other government or private actors. 
The municipalities in the second group, those driven by regulations on their municipal 
utilities, find opportunity in the multilevel governance framework. The utilities generate revenue 
that can be used in support of energy conservation. Public officials in these municipalities speak 
less about restrictions on capacity and find ways to leverage their connections to the utility. 
Utilities are key players in both compelling action and enabling it. Although government-owned, 
these utilities are market-oriented partners in a networked, multilevel governance structure that 
operates with different priorities than municipalities.  
Another theme that emerges across both groups is the lack of a major role for citizens, 
who are important internal drivers in a public choice framework. This study found only one 
community in which citizens played an instigating role in climate action. In the eleven other 
municipalities citizens are barely active in the issue. Such a finding might be expected in deviant 
communities, by the nature of the sample. However, it remains in stark contrast to much of the 
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literature that emphasizes the important role of citizen activism in building and sustaining 
support for local issues. Citizens could play a role advocating for action, especially when the 
cost/benefit equation tips towards the negative and makes it harder for local managers to find 
support for action. Citizens might also augment the capacity of small, local governments through 
their work on boards or commissions (Homsy, 2013).  
The lack of such activism in this study raises questions about the sustainability of staff-
initiated programs and policies. One community leader describes a lessening of support for local 
sustainability efforts, when the mayor who initiated much of the action, passed away. Important 
policy goals must be institutionalized through the bureaucracy and not simply personalized 
through leadership (Moore, 2000). This research indicates the importance of policy entrepreneurs 
to initiating climate action, but leaves open the question about the longevity of such policies if 
popular support is not mobilized.  
This study also reveals that municipal networks and professional organizations play an 
important role in the exchange of information among small municipalities. Much climate change 
research has focused on transnational networks, such as ICLEI-Local Governments for 
Sustainability or the U.S. Conference of Mayors, as important for knowledge transfer and 
political cover. However, studies indicate that such groups play a limited role in pushing climate 
action on to the local agenda (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006). For the public officials in this sample, 
regional or statewide networks serve to advance sustainability conceptually and technically with 
local officials reporting that regional and state conferences are an important source of 
information. In these networks, public officials can more likely find economically, culturally, 
and climatically peer communities, than if they were in a national or trans-national network. 
These smaller groups add capacity to local governments by writing and administering grants.  
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Conclusion 
Public entrepreneurs, driven by internal priorities, are important to the initiation of local 
climate change action, but this study of unlikely pioneers indicates that significant local 
policymaking cannot be expected under a purely public choice framework. Those in this study 
that sought to go it alone needed some kind of external capacity to initiate programs – even 
projects with short-term financial paybacks. The role of the municipal utilities is interesting in 
this regard. It brings top-down regulation onto municipalities, but provides a market mechanism 
for funding locally-designed greenhouse gas reduction efforts. Leaders develop strategies that fit 
their communities culturally, economically, and politically while satisfying the external mandate. 
These examples show that a multilevel governance framework can compel local action and, at 
the same time, allow local leaders to shape climate change mitigation strategies best suited to 
their conditions.  
This study is one of the first to examine smaller places – those municipalities where most 
Americans live. These policy entrepreneurs must shape climate action policies to fit a local 
agenda, which is often focused on saving money. The leaders in these smaller communities are 
sophisticated in their understanding of climate change, but push up against capacity constraints. 
Smaller places benefit from a multilevel governance approach in partnership with state and 
market actors (such as municipal utilities) which provide incentives and capacity to 
communities. This study demonstrates that despite the “pioneering” label, when it comes to 
climate change, these local governments cannot get very far on their own.  
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!
CHAPTER FIVE !
CONCLUSION!
!
The three papers of this dissertation squarely situate the actions of local governments 
regarding climate change within a collaborative web. Despite popular notions of local control 
and the academic blind eye to state government’s role in municipal policymaking, cities and 
towns are not lone or independent actors in the area of climate change. Chapter two of this 
dissertation establishes a climate change action framework in which local knowledge and policy 
is a crucial part of an effective co-production relationship with centralized authority. The 
proposition is empirically tested in chapter three with the main finding that a multilevel 
governance environment does enhance the odds of climate change action at the local level, 
especially among smaller places. Chapter four examines a subset of municipalities qualitatively 
and reveals the importance of entrepreneurial leadership, but also finds the capacity restrictions 
facing places trying to act. Taken together, my research indicates that local government can be 
innovative, but innovation is limited when municipalities act alone. 
As discussed in chapter two, the role of higher levels of authority is not simply to impose 
a top-down regulatory regime on municipalities. Such an approach is too blunt to deal with the 
complexity of climate change action by local governments. Instead, the state and federal 
government play multiple roles in coordinating action, building capacity, providing expertise, 
and sanctioning municipalities that fail to act. Municipalities can translate centralized knowledge 
into policy to meet climate protection goals. The notion of coproduction of both knowledge and 
policy among rural communities which we began to develop in chapter two has become an 
important theme in my research. This collaborative approach recognizes that the vast web of 
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actors (public and private) across multiple levels of government dismantles traditional 
bureaucratic stovepipes that focus on single-issues. The multilevel governance and multi-agency 
collaborative approach is integral to solving complex issues and has implications beyond the 
rural municipalities described in the second chapter. 
The statistical analysis in chapter three finds local government capacity to be significant 
for all cities. The public official interviews in chapter four reveal that every municipality in the 
sample needed outside capacity in order to undertake climate change action. Even those driven 
by an internal desire to reduce budgets through energy conservation used external grants or 
expertise to initiate action. This finding among small municipalities is consistent with previous 
research that even big cities engaged in climate change policymaking need outside financial 
support (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006; Holgate, 2007; Wang, Hawkins, Lebredo, & Berman, 2012).  
The interviews with local officials in smaller communities find that cost savings is the 
primary driver of local climate change action, which is also the motivation found previously in 
big cities (Kousky & Schneider, 2003). The budget as a driver of climate action is not a 
surprising frame as expenditures and taxes shape local politics and officials often use the budget 
as a management tool. Budget efficiency is used to convince those not interested in climate 
change or environmental protection that climate action is warranted.  
The statistical analysis in chapter three also finds that municipalities in states with 
climate plans had increased odds of action. These plans do not require action by local 
governments. Instead, as I put forth in that chapter, the presence of a state plan creates a political 
and technical atmosphere conducive to action. The interviews in chapter four add some detail 
about the role of the state in municipal action. Clearly regulations are important. Even though no 
state mandates municipal action, some do require greenhouse gas emissions reductions and 
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energy conservation by utilities, including municipally-owned ones. This has pushed 
municipalities to greater reductions than they would have undertaken otherwise as well as 
introduced and sensitized local officials to the issue. A second role for states is the potential 
provision of fiscal capacity. In this interview sample, state funding does not play a major role in 
providing capacity, but one of a number of potential sources of funding. However, that could 
simply be a matter of sample size and selection; further investigation in this area is warranted. 
The importance of state government differs between larger and smaller places. While 
both benefit from being situated within a multilevel environment; state government is more 
important to smaller places while state-to-state regional initiatives increase the odds of action 
among bigger cities. Perhaps this reflects the lower need by big cities for the capacity and 
technical expertise that a connection to state government brings. It may also be recognition of the 
growing role of municipalities in a globalized world (Sassen, 2004), though that moniker is 
typically reserved for the biggest urban cores.  
Size is not the only factor that distinguishes the ability of municipalities to act. As the 
results in chapter three demonstrate, central cities are twice as likely to plan for and implement 
climate change policies as either suburbs or rural areas, even when controlling for politics, size, 
state government, capacity, and other factors. Suburbs may be free riding on the knowledge and 
policy implementations generated in urban cores; they do not act because they do not have to. 
Rural places may lack the technical knowledge to pursue many policies on their own (Carter & 
Culp, 2010) and they may be too far away from the knowledge and activity of urban cores to 
benefit from spillovers. The lower results by suburbs and rural places may also result from the 
fact that most municipalities, especially smaller ones, simply do not have control over many 
sectors that contribute to climate change. For example, even if public transportation is controlled 
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by a state or independent agency, central cities tend to have more political influence in shaping 
those systems than suburban or rural communities which are party of the same system.  
The enterprising nature of municipal managers and other public officials is an important 
driver of climate change action as described in chapter four. City staff, sometimes using 
strategies vetted by their professional networks, reframe policies of global import, such as 
climate change mitigation, to fit a local agenda, most often budget savings through energy 
conservation. In order to undertake these programs, the bureaucrats find themselves needing to 
reframe policies to fit local political circumstance. The officials also expend considerable effort 
finding outside funding by writing grants or redirecting utility revenues. Municipal utilities, on 
the other hand, bring with them external regulation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but also 
a revenue stream that can be used for conservation.  
 
Future research 
The insight that municipalities do not act alone positions my research agenda going 
forward. Three interesting surprises emerged in my dissertation and these form one part of my 
research agenda going forward. In addition, a number of questions I had early in the research, but 
could not answer in these this set of papers, remain. I summarize these as well.  
 
Surprises 
First, the importance of statewide and regional networks was an interesting theme that 
emerged from the interviews with public officials described in chapter four. Increasingly 
research finds that the transnational networks (such as ICLEI Local Governments for 
Sustainability) are ineffective at pushing climate change action beyond pioneering communities 
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(Bulkeley & Kern, 2006). However, many of the public officials interviewed for this dissertation 
found great value in regional, state, and sub-state networks. There are a number of possible 
reasons for this. One is that officials seek to learn from the practices of “similar” communities 
(Bassett & Shandas, 2010; Carter & Culp, 2010). While the climate change actions in Stockholm 
may be fascinating to American public officials, the governance structure, economy, politics, 
available capacity, and a host of other factors make the practices harder to apply in their 
communities. Even best practices disseminated at national level conferences might not be as 
applicable. In this area, I want to explore three research questions. First, I want to investigate the 
successes and challenges of the handful of regional climate change efforts underway in a number 
of metropolitan regions. Second, I want, via a survey, to examine the correlation between levels 
of sustainability and climate change action and membership in various local, regional, national, 
or international networks. Third, I already plan to explore the possibilities for a new multi-state 
regional governance system, which I started to outline in chapter two of this dissertation. 
The second surprise results from the discrepancy between the results in chapters three 
and four over the role of citizens. The statistical analysis in chapter three indicates the 
importance of a citizen commission as well as measures of community capacity to climate 
change action. This finding is consistent with other studies focusing on general issues of 
sustainability, though unlike the ICMA survey upon which my analysis in chapter three is based, 
all of these other studies use proxies for citizen involvement (O’Connell, 2009; Portney, 2013; 
Portney & Berry, 2010; Ramírez de la Cruz, 2009; Zahran, Brody, Vedlitz, Grover, & Miller, 
2008). However, only one of the public officials interviewed for chapter four described an 
important role for citizens. This might not be surprising as communities used in chapter four are 
supposed to be the ‘deviant ones’ that do not fit the model in chapter three. By definition, this 
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might account for the finding of a lower role for citizens among the communities examined in 
chapter four. However, the potential for a reduced policy role for citizens in smaller places fits 
my experience as a consultant working with local governments. Under most circumstances, 
elected and appointed officials drove budget and policy decisions with little to no input from the 
public. Public participation became a factor only around very controversial decisions. The 
finding of chapter four, then, raises the possibility that the role of the citizen is different in 
smaller places or around issues of sustainability. Both through a survey and a series of case 
studies, I want to investigate the role of citizens in climate change and sustainability 
policymaking as well as in smaller municipalities.  
Third, the interviews in chapter four revealed the impact of municipal utilities and the 
three roles these institutions play in capacity provision, education, and implementation of state 
and federal mandates. This was unexpected and is rarely described in the existing literature. The 
role of municipal utilities and similar institutions is a compelling topic as we understand 
municipalities to be actors within a collaborative web. Already I have begun a case study project 
with a colleague at the University of Aberdeen focusing on community-owned wind projects in 
New York and Scotland. I have also included a question about the presence of a municipal utility 
on a survey about planning and the environment that is being sent to public officials in New 
York State cities, villages, and towns.  
Other questions 
First, I have a lingering question about the role of planning and comprehensive plans in 
the advancement of sustainability policy and climate change policy. Despite the proliferation of 
sustainability plans, climate change plans, and other environmental documents, the 
comprehensive plan (also known in different states as a ‘master plan’ or a ‘general plan’) 
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remains the most common document providing a vision for a community. Many municipalities 
engage in strategic planning, but that often focuses on local government operations and often has 
a shorter time frame. The first step in this project would be to analyze two sets of plans to 
understand the ways that municipalities integrate sustainability and climate change. The first set 
of plans would be a randomly drawn sample from around the country stratified by region and 
size. The second set would be the plans given top awards by the American Planning Association 
to see how sustainability and climate change may or may not be included in each.  
Second, I would like to begin investigating the efficacy of municipal planning and 
policymaking in the area of sustainability. Are communities implementing sustainability 
strategies and do these strategies have the intended outcomes? While there is a growing body of 
research on the former, less has been undertaken on the overall impact of local sustainability 
policy. This is particularly important as I find that many municipalities are driven to act by cost 
savings, which may not materialize (Kousky & Schneider, 2003). I have started gathering 
national data for an examination of “best practices” in land use. My first interest is incentive 
zoning, which is used to push the private sector to provide public goods, such as open space, 
green buildings, and affordable housing. This represents a kind of governance strategy that is 
growing as municipalities face tighter budgets and increasingly rely on a variety of public-
private relationships. Research evidence suggests this might be a successful strategy in big cities, 
but, as with other aspects of my research, I seek to understand whether or not incentive zoning is 
appropriate in smaller cities or suburban areas. 
Third, sustainability raises questions about the ability of municipalities to navigate the 
“sustainability triangle” of economic, environmental and equity concerns (Campbell, 1996). 
Sustainability’s requirement to balance environment, economy, and social equity offers a 
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possible operating framework for local governance going forward in the 21st century (Fiorino, 
2010). In a paper not included in this dissertation, Mildred Warner and I find that environmental 
protection and economic development are not mutually exclusive; although the challenge of 
bridging equity and the environment remains (Homsy & Warner, 2013). Poor people often bear 
the brunt of environmental degradation in the siting of polluting or hazardous facilities (Bullard 
& Johnson, 2000). The ability of local governments to engage all three factors will be an 
important project in the sustainability field. 
Final thoughts 
The impetus for this research started on the ground. As a practicing planner, I worked 
with small cities, villages, and towns throughout New York State as they wrestled with issues of 
environmental and economic sustainability. I have had many successes among my clients. I have 
been a part of and witnessed local government innovation first hand. But two main frustrations 
always nagged at me as a planner and eventually drove my research agenda. First, the 
municipalities in which I worked always planned alone, ignoring neighboring governments. 
Also, many of the best practices available to professionals, especially in terms of environmental 
sustainability and climate change, came from big cities. I knew and my clients knew that many 
of the lessons simply would not translate.  
Through this research, I have been able to situate the municipality – not as a lone actor, 
but as one piece of a partnership. Other members of the collaboration include higher levels of 
government, citizens, nongovernmental organizations and businesses, and other municipalities. 
This is a reality that our focus on localism and public choice models of planning and 
policymaking keeps hidden, both to local government planners (such as me at the time) and to 
many researchers investigating urban policy. My research builds on the foundation of others who 
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understand that the competitive, non-cooperative nature of many municipal relationships is 
counterproductive on both environmental and economic issues.  
I have also been able to uncover important similarities and differences between large 
communities and smaller ones around climate change and sustainability. Previous studies only 
hinted at the importance of examining municipal actions by size. Eventually, as my research 
agenda continues to unfold, I believe this will be an area where I will make an important policy 
contribution. Those seeking to influence the actions of local governments will have a more 
realistic picture of the circumstance in which municipalities act.  
Finally, I see the value of focusing on the power of coproduction relationships, both as a 
theoretical framework governing my research and as an overriding policy approach. Governance 
in the United States is a federalist venture, which should be the basis for a collaboration. In the 
area of climate change, local innovations and policy perspectives are crucial, but they must be 
undertaken within a multilevel structure that provides incentives, goals, technical expertise, and 
capacity. As with so many other aspects of society, saving the planet from climate change will 
not come from the actions of isolated actors, but from the vast majority pushing – in their own 
way – towards a common goal.  
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